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Abstract
We prove that finding an -approximate Nash equilibrium is PPAD-
complete for constant  and a particularly simple class of games: polyma-
trix, degree 3 graphical games, in which each player has only two actions.
As corollaries, we also prove similar inapproximability results for Bayesian
Nash equilibrium in a two-player incomplete information game with a con-
stant number of actions, for relative -Well Supported Nash Equilibrium
in a two-player game, for market equilibrium in a non-monotone market,
for the generalized circuit problem defined by Chen et al [CDT09], and for
approximate competitive equilibrium from equal incomes with indivisible
goods.
1 Introduction
Nash equilibrium is the central concept in Game Theory. Much of its importance
and attractiveness comes from its universality: by Nash’s Theorem [Nas51], ev-
ery finite game has at least one. The result that finding a Nash equilibrium is
PPAD-complete, and therefore intractable [DGP09, CDT09] casts this univer-
sality in doubt, since it suggests that there are games whose Nash equilibria,
though existent, are in any practical sense inaccessible.
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Can approximation repair this problem? Chen et al [CDT09] proved that
it is also hard to find an -approximate Nash equilibrium for any  that is
polynomially small - even for two-player games. The only remaining hope is a
PTAS, i.e. an approximation scheme for any constant  > 0. Whether there is
a PTAS for the Nash equilibrium problem is the most important remaining open
question in equilibrium computation.
For a constant number of players, we are unlikely to prove PPAD-hardness
since a quasi-polynomial time approximation algorithm exists [LMM03]1. We
therefore shift our attention to games with a large number of players. For such
games, there is a question of representation: the normal form representation is
exponential in the number of the players. Instead, we consider two natural and
well-studied concise representations:
Polymatrix games In a polymatrix game, each pair of players simultaneously
plays a separate two-player game. Every player has to play the same
strategy in every two-player subgame, and her utility is the sum of her
subgame utilities. The game is given in the form of the payoff matrix for
each two-player game.
Graphical games In a graphical game [Kea07], the utility of each player de-
pends only on the action chosen by a few other players. This game now
naturally induces a directed graph: we say that (i, j) ∈ E if the utility of
player j depends on the strategy chosen by player i. When the maximal
incoming degree is bounded, the game has a representation polynomial in
the number of players and strategies.
Our results
We prove that even for games that are both polymatrix and graphical (for partic-
ularly simple graphs) finding an -approximate Nash equilibrium is intractable.
Theorem 1. There exists a constant  > 0, such that given a degree 3, bipartite,
polymatrix game where each player has two actions, finding an -approximate
Nash equilibrium is PPAD-complete.
In previous works [CDT09, DGP09], hardness of Nash equilibrium in two-
player games was obtained from hardness of a bipartite polymatrix game. Roughly
1In followup work [Rub16] we prove that assuming the “Exponential Time Hypothesis
(ETH) for PPAD”, quasi-polynomial running time of [LMM03]’s algorithm is indeed necessary.
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speaking, the reduction lets each of the two players choose the strategies for the
vertices on one side of the bipartite graphical game. This reduction incurs a
polynomial blowup in the error - and indeed, as discussed earlier, we do not ex-
pect to obtain PPAD-hardness for -approximate Nash equilibrium in two-player
games. Nevertheless, in Section 8 we show that a similar technique yields an
interesting corollary for -approximate Bayesian Nash equilibrium in two-player
games with incomplete information.
Corollary 1 (-Bayesian Nash equilibrium). There exists a constant  > 0, such
that given a two-player game with incomplete information where each player has
a constant number of actions, finding an -approximate Bayesian Nash equilib-
rium is PPAD-complete.
In two-player complete information games, Daskalakis [Das13] circumvents
Lipton et al’s quasi-polynomial time algorithm by studying a notion of relative
(sometimes also called multiplicative [HdRS08], as opposed to the more standard
additive) -Well Supported Nash Equilibrium (relative -WSNE). Daskalakis
proves that in two player games with payoffs in [−1, 1], finding a relative -WSNE
is PPAD-complete. One caveat of this result is that the gain from deviation
is large compared to the expected payoff because the latter is small due to
cancellation of positive and negative payoffs. Namely, the gain from deviation
may be very small compared to the expected magnitude of the payoff. Here we
answer an open question from [Das13] by proving that finding a relative -WSNE
continues to be PPAD-complete even when all the payoffs are positive.
Corollary 2 (Relative -WSNE). There exists a constant  > 0 such that finding
a relative -Well Supported Nash Equilibrium in a bimatrix game with positive
payoffs is PPAD-complete.
The computation of Nash equilibrium is tightly related to computation of
equilibrium in markets. In particular, Chen, Paparas, and Yannakakis [CPY13]
use a reduction from polymatrix games to prove PPAD-hardness for the com-
putation of equilibrium for every family of utility functions from a very general
class, which they call non-monotone families of utility functions. In Section 10
we prove the following hardness of approximation for market equilibrium.
Corollary 3 (Non-monotone markets). Let U be any non-monotone family of
utility functions. There exists a constant U > 0 such that given a market M
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where the utility of each trader is either linear or taken from U , finding an
U -tight approximate market equilibrium is PPAD-hard.
Although our inapproximability factor is stronger than that showed by Chen
et al, the results are incomparable as ours only holds for the stronger notion of
“tight” approximate equilibrium, by which we mean the more standard definition
which bounds the two-sided error of the market equilibrium. Chen et al, in
contrast, prove that even if we allow arbitrary excess supply, finding a (1/n)-
approximate equilibrium is PPAD-hard. Furthermore, for the interesting case of
CES utilities with parameter ρ < 0, they show that there exist markets where
every (1/2)-tight equilibrium requires prices that are doubly-exponentially large
(and thus require an exponential-size representation). Indeed, for a general
non-monotone family U , the problem of computing a (tight or not) approximate
equilibrium may not belong to PPAD. Nevertheless, the important family of
additively separable, concave piecewise-linear utilities is known to satisfy the
non-monotone condition [CPY13], and yet the computation of (exact) market
equilibrium is in PPAD [VY11]. Therefore,
Corollary 4 (SPLC markets). There exists a constant  > 0, such that find-
ing an -tight approximate market equilibrium with additively separable, concave
piecewise-linear utilities is PPAD-complete.
En route to proving our main result, we also prove hardness of approximation
for the generalized circuit problem. Generalized circuits are similar to standard
algebraic circuits, the main difference being that generalized circuits contain
cycles, which allow them to verify fixed points of continuous functions. A gen-
eralized circuit induces a constraint satisfaction problem, -Gcircuit [CDT09]:
find an assignment for the values on the lines of the circuit, that simultaneously
-approximately satisfies all the constraints imposed by the gates (see Section
3.2 for a formal definition). -Gcircuit was implicitly proven PPAD-complete
for exponentially small  by Daskalakis et al [DGP09], and explicitly for poly-
nomially small  by Chen et al [CDT09]. Here we prove that it continues to be
PPAD-complete for some constant .
Theorem 2 (Generalized circuit). There exists a constant  > 0 such that -
Gcircuit with fan-out 2 is PPAD-complete.
The -Gcircuit problem has already proven useful in several works in re-
cent years (e.g [CDT09, Das13, CPY13, OPR14]). We believe that Theorem 2
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will lead to stronger hardness results in many applications in algorithmic game
theory and economics. For example, competitive equilibrium with equal incomes
(CEEI) is a well-known fair allocation mechanism [Fol67, Var74, TV85]; however,
for indivisible resources a CEEI may not exist. It was shown by Budish [Bud11]
that in the case of indivisible resources there is always an allocation, called A-
CEEI, that is approximately fair, approximately truthful, and approximately
efficient, for some favorable approximation parameters. This approximation is
used in practice to assign business school students to classes [Oth14].
The approximation of CEEI is characterized by two parameters: α, which is
a measure of the market clearing error, and β, which quantifies the inequality in
initial endowments. Budish’s proof guarantees the existence of an (α∗, β)-CEEI
for any β > 0 (and some parameter α∗ that depends on the input). Othman et
al [OPR14] reduced Θ (β log (1/β))-Gcircuit with fan-out 2 to the problem of
finding the guaranteed approximation, (α∗, β)-CEEI. Theorem 2 now gives the
following corollary:
Corollary 5 (A-CEEI). There exists a constant β > 0 such that finding an
(α∗, β)-CEEI is PPAD-complete.
1.1 Related works
This work extends [DGP09, CDT09, CPY13, OPR14] where similar hardness
results were established for 1/poly (n)-approximation. It also extends our own
[Rub14], where we proved PPAD-hardness of -Well Supported Nash equilibrium
(-WSNE), for constant  and a constant number of actions per player, over a
larger class of games called succinct games. Succinct games can have much more
complex utilities than polymatrix or graphical games of bounded degree: any
utility function that can be computed in polynomial time is allowed.
We improve over the results of [Rub14] in three ways: (1) simplicity: our new
hardness result holds for a much simpler and more natural definition of games;
(2) -ANE vs -WSNE: thanks to the transformation to bounded degree graph-
ical games our result extends to the weaker concept (thus stronger hardness) of
-approximate Nash equilibrium (see Section 3.1 for precise definitions); and (3)
completeness: finding an approximate Nash equilibrium in a bounded-degree
graphical game is not only PPAD-hard - it also belongs to PPAD [DGP09]. For
succinct games, in contrast, -WSNE is unlikely to belong to PPAD since it is
also known to be BPP-hard [SV12].
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On the technical side, our current construction of hard instances of Brouwer
fixed points is identical to [Rub14]. The main technical contribution in this
paper is the adaptation of the equiangle sampling gadget of Chen et al [CDT09]
to this particular Brouwer function.
Query complexity There are several interesting results on the query com-
plexity of approximate Nash equilibria, where the algorithm is assumed to have
black-box access to the exponential-size payoff function.
Hart and Nisan [HN13] prove that any deterministic algorithm needs to query
at least an exponential number of queries to compute any -Well Supported
Nash Equilibrium - and even for any -correlated equilibrium. For -correlated
equilibrium, on the other hand, Hart and Nisan show a randomized algorithm
that uses a number of queries polynomial in n and −1.
Babichenko [Bab14] showed that any randomized algorithm requires an ex-
ponential number of queries to find an -Well Supported Nash Equilibrium.
Our proof is inspired by Babichenko’s work and builds on some of his tech-
niques. Babichenko’s query complexity lower bound was eventually extended to
-Approximate Nash Equilibrium [CCT15, Rub16] and later also to communi-
cation complexity [BR16].
Goldberg and Roth [GR14] characterize the query complexity of approximate
coarse correlated equilibrium in games with many players. More important for
our purpose is their polynomial upper bound on the query complexity of -WSNE
for any family of games that have any concise representation. This result is to
be contrasted with (a) Babichenko’s query complexity lower bound, which uses
a larger family of games, and (b) [Rub14] which applies exactly to this setting
and gives a lower bound on the computational complexity.
A much older yet very interesting and closely related result is that of Hirsch,
Papadimitriou, and Vavasis [HPV89]. Hirsch et al show that any deterministic
algorithm for computing a Brouwer fixed point in the oracle model must make
an exponential -in the dimension n and the approximation - number of queries
for values of the function. The techniques in [HPV89] have proven particularly
useful both in [Bab14, Rub14] and here.
Approximation algorithms In any polymatrix game and for any constant
δ > 0, Deligkas et al [DFSS14] give a polynomial time algorithm for finding a
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(1/2 + δ)-ANE. For the special case of polymatrix graphical games on a tree
graph, Barman et al [BLP15] give a PTAS.
Followup work on PCP for PPAD Following our work, [BPR16] conjecture
the following robust strengthening of our main theorem: given a polymatrix,
graphical game, it is PPAD-hard to find a strategy profile where a (1− δ)-fraction
of the players are playing -approximate best response, for some constants , δ >
0. (Our Theorem 1 corresponds to the case of δ = 1/poly (n).) [BPR16] prove
that this so-called “PCP for PPAD” is equivalent to a robust variant of our
Theorem 2, and implies robust versions of Corollaries 2 and 5. This conjecture
remains an open problem.
[Rub16] uses related ideas to prove that the quasi-polynomial time algo-
rithm of Lipton et al [LMM03] for -ANE in two-player games is essentially
tight: improving to polynomial time would imply an unlikely subexponential-
time algorithm for EndOfTheLine.
2 Proof overview
We begin our proof of Theorem 1 with the EndOfTheLine problem over {0, 1}n
[DGP09]. Our first step (Section 4) is to reduce this problem to the problem of
finding an approximate fixed point of a particular continuous function, inspired
by the work of Hirsch et al [HPV89] (this reduction also appeared in [Rub14]).
Our second step (Section 5) is to reduce the problem of finding an approximate
fixed point of this particular function to that of finding an approximate solution
to a generalized circuit. In Section 6, we further reduce to a generalized circuit
with fan-out 2. Our final step (Section 7) is to reduce the problem of finding an
approximate solution to a circuit with fan-out 2 to that of finding an approximate
Nash equilibrium. This reduction follows directly from the game gadgets of
Daskalakis et al [DGP09] which establishes the result for -WSNE. We complete
the proof by pointing out that for bounded degree graphical games, finding an
-WSNE reduces to finding a Θ (2)-ANE.
Our main technical contribution is in the second step, which reduces finding
an approximate fixed point of a particular continuous function, to finding an
approximate solution to [CDT09]’s generalized circuit problem. We provide
further details below (see also Section 5).
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Obtaining a constant hardness of -Gcircuit
A key idea that enables us to improve over previous hardness of approximation
for −Gcircuit (and Nash equilibrium) [DGP09, CDT09] is that we start from
a better instance of Brouwer function due to [HPV89]. The first advantage is
that our instance is simply harder to approximate: finding an -approximate
fixed point (i.e. x such that ‖f (x)− x‖∞ ≤ ) is PPAD-hard for  = Ω (1)
(as opposed to  = 1/ exp (n) for [DGP09] and  = 1/poly (n) in [CDT09]).
This advantage of the Hirsch et al construction was used before by Babichenko
[Bab14] and also in [Rub14].
A simpler averaging gadget Our construction of hard instances of Brouwer
functions, as do the ones form previous works, partitions the (continuous) hyper-
cube into subcubes, and define the function separately on each subcube. When
we construct a circuit that approximately simulates such a Brouwer function,
we have a problem near the facets of the subcubes: using approximate gates and
brittle comparators (both defined formally in Section 3.2), one cannot determine
to which subcube the input belongs. This is the most challenging part of our
reduction, as was also the case in [DGP09, CDT09].
Originally, Daskalakis et al [DGP09] tackled this obstacle by approximating
f (x) as the average over a ball around x. The key observation is that even if x is
close to a facet between subcubes, most of the points in its neighborhoods will be
sufficiently far. Yet if f is Lipschitz they are mapped approximately to the same
point as x. This works fine in O (1) dimensions, but then the inapproximability
parameter is inherently exponentially small (in constant dimensions, it is easy
to construct a 1/poly (n)-net over the unit hypercube). For poly (n) dimensions,
the (discretization of the) ball around x contains exponentially many points.
Chen et al [CDT09] overcome this problem using equiangle sampling: con-
sider many translations of the input vector by adding small multiples of the
all-ones vector; compute the displacement for each translation, and average.
Since each translation may be close to a facet in a different dimension, Chen et
al consider a polynomial number of translations. Thus, all translations must be
polynomially close to each other - otherwise they will be too far to approximate
the true input.
We avoid this problem by observing another nice property of the [HPV89]’s
construction: when the input vector lies near two or more facets, the displace-
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Figure 1: Comparison of averaging gadgets
x
Daskalakis et al
[DGP09]
x
Chen et al [CDT09]
x
This paper
A comparison of the averaging gadgets of [DGP09], [CDT09], and this paper. x
is the point whose displacement we would like to estimate using imprecise gates
and brittle comparators. Points that are too close to a facet between subcubes
are denoted by triangles, while points that are sufficiently far are denoted by
circles. Finally, in this paper we have a “safe” zone (shaded) around the corner
where we don’t need to parse the subcube; thus we only need to avoid one facet.
ment is (approximately) the same, regardless of the subcube. Once we rule out
such points, it suffices to sample only a constant number of points (as at most
one of them may be too close to a facet). See also illustration in Figure 2.
Completing the proof Given a point x′ ≈ x which is safely in the interior of
one subcube, we can parse the corresponding binary vector, use logical operator
gates to simulate the EndOfTheLine circuit, and then approximately compute
f
(
x
′). This is tedious, but mostly straightforward.
One particular challenge that nevertheless arises is preventing the error from
accumulating when concatenating approximate gates. Of course this is more
difficult in our setting where each gate may err by a constant  > 0. Fortu-
nately, the definition of -Gcircuit provides logical operator gates that round
the output to {0, 1} before introducing new error. As long as the inputs are un-
ambiguous bits, approximate logical operator gates can be concatenated without
accumulating errors.
In order to carry out the reduction to Nash equilibrium (Section 7), we must
first ensure that every gate in our generalized circuit has a constant fan-out
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(Section 6). We can replace each logical operator gate with a binary tree of
fan-out 2, alternating negation gates (that do not accumulate error). Given an
arithmetic gate with large fan-out, we convert its output to unary representa-
tion2 using a constant number of (fan-out 2) gates. Then we copy the unary
representation using a binary tree of negation gates. Finally, we convert each
copy back to a real number using a constant number of gates.
2.1 Alternative proofs
We informally sketch a couple of different approaches that could lead to our
main theorem or similar results.
No averaging gadget
The simpler averaging gadget was perhaps the main breakthrough that enabled
us to improve on the results in [Rub14]. In hindsight it seems that we could
completely avoid the use of averaging gadgets. As we discuss in the previous
subsection, reducing from the Hirsch et al Brouwer function allows us to treat
corners, i.e. the intersection of two or more facets, differently. In particular,
near corners we don’t need to determine to which subcube our input vector
belongs because the displacement is always the same. The simpler averaging
gadget is used when we are close to one facet.
Alternatively, one could construct a gadget that determines that the input
is close to a particular facet -without deciding on which side of the facet- and
compute the Hirsch et al displacement on that facet. Thus, no averaging gadget
is needed, but some care is necessary when stitching together the corner gadget
(which would be the same as this paper), the facet gadget, and the interior point
gadget.
A richer set of gates
There is also a simpler and more intuitive reduction that gives somewhat weaker
results, namely: PPAD-completeness for degree 3 graphical games with a con-
stant number of actions per player.
2Unary representation of numbers with constant precision is prevalent throughout our
implementation of the generalized circuit. We prefer unary representation over binary, because
in the former at most one bit can be ambiguous due to the use of brittle comparators.
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The most arduous part in our proof is the second step, which takes us from
the Hirsch et al Brouwer function to a generalized circuit. In order to prove
this reduction, we must design a circuit (or an algorithm) that implements the
equiangle sampling and the Hirsch et al Brouwer function using the limited set
of gates allowed in Chen et al’s definition of -Gcircuit. This part could be
simplified using a more expressive set of gates.
A recent reduction that appeared in Eran Shmaya’s blog [Shm12] would es-
sentially allow us to to replace the -Gcircuit gates with any gates of bounded
fan-in and fan-out that compute c-Lipschitz functions for any constant c. We
briefly sketch here this reduction from an arbitrary generalized circuit to a graph-
ical game:
Each line in the circuit corresponds to a player, and we connect all players
that share a common gate. The pure strategies of each player correspond to an
O ()-discretization of [0, 1]. When the player that corresponds to the output
of gate G plays strategy b, and the input players play strategies a1 and a2, the
utility to the output player is given by
u (b, a1, a2) = − |b−G (a1, a2)|2
It can be shown that in any O (2)-WSNE of this game, the output player only
uses the strategy3 b∗ which is closest to Ea1,a2 [G (a1, a2)] (i.e. the expectation
of G (a1, a2) over the mixed strategies of the input players).
3 Preliminaries
Throughout this paper we use the max-norm as the default measure of distance.
In particular, when we say that f is M -Lipschitz we mean that for every x and
y in the domain of f , ‖f (x)− f (y)‖∞ ≤M ‖x− y‖∞.
A large part of our paper deals with approximate solutions to equations. We
adopt the notation of writing x = y ±  to imply that x ∈ (y − , y + ).
We use ξi to denote the i-th standard basis vector, and 0n to denote the
all-zeros vector.
3There may be two strategies which are equally close to Ea1,a2 [G (a1, a2)], in which case
the output player may use a mixed strategy.
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The EndOfTheLine problem
Our reduction starts from the EndOfTheLine problem. This problem was
implicit in [Pap94], and explicitly defined in [DGP09].
Definition 1. EndOfTheLine: ([DGP09]) Given two circuits S and P , with
n input bits and n output bits each, such that P (0n) = 0n 6= S (0n), find an
input x ∈ {0, 1}n such that P (S (x)) 6= x or S (P (x)) 6= x 6= 0n.
We like to interpret EndOfTheLine as a problem over a graph which is
implicitly defined by circuits S and P : every vertex x ∈ {0, 1}n has one incoming
edge from P (x), and one outgoing edge to S (x). The only exceptions are
sources, for which P (x) = x, and sinks, for which S (x) = x. The special vertex
0n has an odd degree (no incoming edge), so by a parity argument, there must
be at least one more vertex with an odd degree. The goal is to find such a vertex.
For technical reasons, we also allow the solution to point out inconsistencies in
the graph definition (i.e. x thinks it has an incoming edge from y, but y doesn’t
have an outgoing edge to x).
Theorem. (Essentially [Pap94]) EndOfTheLine is PPAD-complete.
3.1 -Well Supported Nash Equilibrium vs -Approximate
Nash Equilibrium
A mixed strategy of player i is a distribution over i’s set of actions, denoted
xi ∈ ∆Ai. We say that a vector of mixed strategies x ∈ ×j∆Aj is a Nash
equilibrium if every strategy ai in the support of xi is a best response to the
actions of the mixed strategies of the rest of the players, x−i. Formally,
∀ai ∈ Supp (xi) Ea−i∼x−i [ui (ai, a−i)] = max
a′∈Ai
Ea−i∼x−i [ui (a′, a−i)] .
Equivalently, x is a Nash equilibrium if each mixed strategy xi is a best mixed
response to x−i:
Ea∼x [ui (a)] = max
x′i∈∆Ai
Ea∼(x′i;x−i) [ui (a)] .
Each of those equivalent definitions can be generalized to include approxima-
tion in a different way. (Of course, there are also other interesting generalizations
12
of Nash equilibria to approximate settings.) We say that x is an -approximate
Nash equilibrium (-ANE) if each xi is an -best mixed response to x−i:
Ea∼x [ui (a)] ≥ max
x
′
i∈∆Ai
Ea∼(x′i;x−i) [ui (a)]−  .
On the other hand, we generalize the first definition of Nash equilibrium by
saying that x is a -Well Supported Nash Equilibrium (-WSNE; sometimes also
just -Nash Equilibrium [Das13]) if each ai in the support of xi is an -best
response to x−i:
∀ai ∈ Supp (xi) Ea−i∼x−i [ui (ai, a−i)] ≥ max
a′∈Ai
Ea−i∼x−i
[
ui
(
a
′
, a−i
)]
−  .
It is easy to see that every -WSNE is also an -ANE, but the converse is
false. In Lemma 5 we prove that given an -ANE in a graphical game with
incoming degree din, it is possible to find a Θ (
√
din)-WSNE. We note that this
approach is unlikely to give a lower bound on the query complexity for -ANE:
graphical games of bounded incoming degree can be learned in a polynomial
number of queries; furthermore, due to [GR14], for any concisely represented
game, it is possible to find an -WSNE (and hence also -ANE) in a polynomial
number of queries.
3.2 The -Gcircuit problem
Generalized circuits are similar to the standard algebraic circuits, the main
difference being that generalized circuits contain cycles, which allow them to
verify fixed points of continuous functions. We restrict the class of generalized
circuits to include only a particular list of gates described below. Formally,
Definition 2. [Generalized circuits, [CDT09]] A generalized circuit S is a pair
(V, T ), where V is a set of nodes and T is a collection of gates. Every gate T ∈ T
is a 5-tuple T = G (ζ | v1, v2 | v), in whichG ∈ {Gζ , G×ζ , G=, G+, G−, G<, G∨, G∧, G¬}
is the type of the gate; ζ ∈ R ∪ {nil} is a real parameter; v1, v2 ∈ V ∪ {nil} are
the first and second input nodes of the gate; and v ∈ V is the output node.
The collection T of gates must satisfy the following important property: For
every two gates T = G (ζ | v1, v2 | v) and T ′ = G′ (ζ ′ | v′1, v′2 | v′) in T , v 6= v′.
Alternatively, we can think of each gate as a constraint on the values on
the incoming and outgoing wires. We are interested in the following constraint
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satisfaction problem: given a generalized circuit, find an assignment to all the
wires that simultaneously satisfies all the gates. When every gate computes a
continuous function of the incoming wires (with inputs and output in [0, 1]), a
solution must exist by Brouwer’s fixed point theorem.
In particular, we are interested in the approximate version of this CSP, where
we must approximately satisfy every constraint.
Definition 3. Given a generalized circuit S = (V, T ), we say that an assign-
ment x : V → [0, 1] -approximately satisfies S if for each of the following gates,
x satisfies the corresponding constraints:
Gate Constraint
Gζ (α || a) x [a] = α± 
G×ζ (α | a | b) x [b] = α · x [a]± 
G= (| a | b) x [b] = x [a]± 
G+ (| a, b | c) x [c] = min (x [a] + x [b] , 1)± 
G− (| a, b | c) x [c] = max (x [a]− x [b] , 0)± 
G< (| a, b | c) x [c] =
1±  x [a] < x [b]− 0±  x [a] > x [b] + 
G∨ (| a, b | c) x [c] =
1±  x [a] = 1±  or x [b] = 1± 0±  x [a] = 0±  and x [b] = 0± 
G∧ (| a, b | c) x [c] =
1±  x [a] = 1±  and x [b] = 1± 0±  x [a] = 0±  or x [b] = 0± 
G¬ (| a | b) x [b] =
1±  x [a] = 0± 0±  x [a] = 1± 
(Where Gζ and G×ζ also take a parameter α ∈ [0, 1].)
Given a generalized circuit S = (V, T ), -Gcircuit is the problem of finding
an assignment that -approximately satisfies it.
Brittle comparators Intuitively, in order for (approximate) solutions to the
circuit problem to correspond to (approximate) equilibria, all our gates should
implement continuous (Lipschitz) functions. The gate G< (| a, b | c), for exam-
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ple, approximates that the function c (a, b) =
1 a < b0 a ≥ b , which is not contin-
uous. To overcome this problem, Daskalakis et al [DGP09] defined the brittle
comparator: when a is (-) larger than b, it outputs 0; when b is (-) larger than
a, it outputs 1. However, when a and b are (-approximately) equal, its behavior
is undefined.
Brittleness introduces difficulties in the transition from continuous to discrete
solutions. This challenge is overcome by an averaging gadget, which is described
in detail in Section 5.
3.3 Max-norm Geometry
As we mentioned earlier, throughout this paper we work with the max-norm.
This has some implications that may contradict our geometric intuition. For
example: in a max-norm world, a circle is a square.
Max-norm interpolation Given coordinates x, y ≥ 0, we define the max-
norm angle4 that point (x, y) forms with the X-axis (in the XY -plane) as
θmax (x, y) =
y
x+ y
The max-norm angle is useful for interpolation. Given the values of f : [0, 1]n →
[0, 1]n on two neighboring facets of the hypercube, we can extend f to all points
of the hypercube by angular interpolation: interpolate according to the max-
norm angle θmax (xi, xj) where xi and xj are the respective distances from the
two facets. When f is defined on two opposite facets, we can simply use Carte-
sian interpolation, which again means to interpolate according to the distance
from each facet.
Max-norm local polar coordinates Given a point z ∈ Rn we define a new
local max-norm polar coordinate system around z. Every x ∈ Rn is transformed
into 〈r,p〉z ∈ R × Rn where r = ‖x− z‖ is the max-norm radius, and p =
(x− z) /r is the max-norm unit vector that points from z in the direction of x.
4Our max-norm angle was called unit in [HPV89].
15
4 Finding an approximate Brouwer fixed point is
PPAD-hard
In the first step of the proof, we show that finding an approximate Brouwer fixed
point is PPAD-hard. Essentially the same reduction also appeared in [Rub14],
and it heavily relies on techniques of Hirsch et al [HPV89].
Theorem 3. (Essentially [Rub14]) There exists a constant  > 0 such that, given
an arithmetic circuit that computes an M-Lipschitz function f : [0, 1]n → [0, 1]n,
finding an -fixed point of f (an x such that ‖f (x)− x‖ ≤ ) is PPAD-hard.
Theorem 3 by itself does not quite suffice for proving our main theorem. In
Section 5 we use the specific properties of our construction, in particular those
detailed in Fact 1.
Proof. In the first step (Subsection 4.1), we embed the EndOfTheLine prob-
lem (over {0, 1}n) as a collection H of vertex-disjoint paths over the (2n+ 1)-
dimensional hypercube graph. Given H, our second step (Subsection 4.2) is to
construct a continuous mapping f : [0, 1]2n+2 → [0, 1]2n+2 whose fixed points
correspond to ends of paths in H. This step generalizes a construction of Hirsch
et al [HPV89] for embedding a single path.
4.1 Embedding the EndOfTheLine graph as paths in {0, 1}2n+1
Our first step in the reduction is to embed an EndOfTheLine graph as vertex-
disjoint paths on the (2n+ 1)-dimensional hypercube graph. We first recall that
the input to the EndOfTheLine problem is given as two circuits S and P ,
which define a directed graph over G over {0, 1}n. Given S and P , we construct
a collection H of vertex-disjoint paths and cycles over the (2n+ 1)-dimensional
hypercube graph, such that there is a 1-to-1 correspondence between starting
and end points of paths in H and starting and end points of lines in G.
In order to construct our embedding we divide the 2n + 1 coordinates as
follows: the first n coordinates store the current vertex u, the next n coordinates
for the next vertex in the line, v, and finally, the last coordinate b stores a
compute-next vs copy bit. When b = 0, the path proceeds to update v ←
S (u), bit-by-bit. When this update is complete, the value of b is changed to
1. Whenever b = 1, the path proceeds by copying u ← v bit-by-bit, and then
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changes that value of b again. Finally, when u = v = S (u) and b = 0, the path
reaches an end point. For example, the edge x→ y maps into the path:
(x,x, 0)→ · · · → (x,y, 0)→ (x,y, 1)→ · · · → (y,y, 1)→ (y,y, 0) .
Notice that the paths in H do not intersect. Furthermore, given a vector in
p ∈ {0, 1}2n+1, we can output in polynomial time whether p belongs to a path
in H, and if so which are the previous and consecutive vectors in the path. It
is therefore PPAD-hard to find a starting or end point of any path in H other
than 02n+1.
4.2 Continuous mapping on [0, 1]2n+2
In order to construct a hard instance of Brouwer function, we use techniques
introduced by Hirsch, Papadimitriou, and Vavasis [HPV89]. [HPV89] showed
that the number of deterministic value-oracle queries required to find a Brouwer
fixed point is exponential in the number of precision digits, the Lipschitz con-
stant of the function, and -most important to us- the dimension of the domain.
Our construction is almost identical, with the exception that [HPV89] embed a
single path, whereas we embed H which is a collection of paths and cycles.
The continuous Brouwer function is denoted by f : [0, 1]2n+2 → [0, 1]2n+2,
while the associated displacement function is denoted by g (x) = f (x)−x. The
following lemma (proven below) completes the proof of Theorem 3.
Lemma 1. The displacement g satisfies:
1. g is O (1)-Lipschitz (thus, f is also O (1)-Lipschitz)
2. ‖g (x)‖∞ = Ω (1) for every x that does not correspond to the endpoint of
the path
3. The value of g at each point x can be computed in polynomial time using
S and P .
4.2.1 Overview of the construction
The domain of f is the 2n+ 2-dimensional (solid) hypercube. The hypercube is
divided into subcubes, of side length h (we fix h = 1/4). We define f separately
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on each subcube such that it agrees on the intersections (no interpolation is
needed in this sense).
The last ((2n+ 2)-th) dimension is special; we use “up” (resp. “down”) to
refer to the positive (negative) (2n+ 2)-th direction. All the action takes place
in the second-from-bottom (2n+ 1)-dimensional layer of subcubes; this layer is
called the slice. Within the slice, we also ignore the subcubes that are near
the boundary of the hypercube (those compose the frame); we are left with
the subcubes in the center of the slice, which we call the picture. We identify
between the vertices of the (2n+ 1)-dimensional hypercube graph (over which
H was defined) and the 22n+1 subcubes of the picture.
In [HPV89], a single path is embedded inside the picture; this embedded
path is called the tube. The home subcube, the subcube that corresponds to
the beginning of the path, is special: all the flow from all subcubes that do
not belong to the tube leads to this subcube. For our purposes, we consider
many tubes, corresponding to the paths and cycles of H. The home subcube
continues to be special in the sense described above, and it corresponds to the
vertex 02n+1.
Below we define the displacement in the following regions, and argue that it
satisfies the desiderata of Lemma 1:
• Inside the picture, but not in any tube;
• inside a tube; and
• outside the picture.
4.2.2 Default displacement
Most of the slice has the same default displacement: directly upward, i.e. g (x) =
δξ2n+2, where ξ2n+2 is the (2n+ 2)-unit vector, and δ > 0 is a small constant.
Formally,
Fact 1. g (x) = δξ2n+2, for every x such that at least one of the following holds:
1. x lies on a corner, i.e. the intersection of two or more facets of a subcube;
2. x lies on an outer facet of a tube subcube, i.e. a facet other than the two
facets that continue the path; or
3. x lies in a subcube that does not belong to any tube.
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Intuitively, Property 2 implies that all subcubes -whether they belong to the
tube or not- look the same from the outside (except for the two facets that
continue the path). In particular, the displacement on both sides of each facet
is the same; so if the displacement is O (1)-Lipschitz on each subcube, it is also
O (1)-Lipschitz on the entire hypercube.
Property 1, stating that all corners look the same, is key to the sampling
gadget in Section (5), because it liberates us from having to disambiguate the
position of a point near the corners (that is, deciding exactly to which subcube
it belongs). This is useful because those points that are close to corners, are
precisely the ones that are hard to determine using “noisy” gates.
4.2.3 Displacement at a tube
The mapping is defined so that in the center of the tube, the flow goes along
the direction of the path; slightly outside the center, the flow points towards
the center of the tube; further away from the center, the flow goes against
the direction of the path; at the outer boundary of the tube, as we previously
described, the flows goes upwards.
We first define g on facets. Let 〈r,p〉z be a point on the facet centered at
z, and suppose that the tube enters the subcube through z, advancing in the
positive i-th coordinate. We define
g (〈r,p〉z) =

δξi r = 0
−δp r = h/8
−δξi r = h/4
δξ2n+2 r = h/2
(1)
(Recall that h is the subcube side length, and δ is some small constant.) No-
tice that at each r, the displacement g is O (1)-Lipschitz and has magnitude
‖g (x)‖∞ = Ω (1) (thus satisfying the first two desiderata of Lemma 1).
For r ∈ (0, h/8), interpolate between δξi and −δp ([HPV89] call this radial
interpolation), and similarly for r ∈ (h/8, h/4) and r ∈ (h/4, h/2). See also
illustration in Figure 2. It is easy to see that the O (1)-Lipschitz property is
preserved. Notice also that ξi is orthogonal to p and ξ2n+2; this guarantees that
the interpolation does not lead to cancellation, i.e. we still have ‖g (x)‖∞ =
Ω (1).
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In the last couple of paragraphs we defined g on two facets for each subcube
that belongs to the tubes; for all other points in the tubes we interpolate (angular
interpolation) between those two facets: Consider a point x in the tube, and
assume (w.l.o.g.) that xi, xj > 1/2, and suppose that the value of f (·) on the
yi = 1/2 and yj = 1/2 facets of the subcube containing x is determined by (1).
Let
xi =
(
x−i,j,
1
2
,max {xi, xj}
)
xj =
(
x−i,j,max {xi, xj} , 1
2
)
denote the corresponding “max-norm projections” to the respective yi = 1/2 and
yj = 1/2 facets. We set
g (x) = θmax
(
xi − 1
2
, xj − 1
2
)
g
(
xi
)
+
(
1− θmax
(
xi − 1
2
, xj − 1
2
))
g
(
xj
)
.
Notice that xi and xj are at the same distance from the respective facet centers,
i.e. they have they correspond to the same r. For each case of (1), the (i, j)-
components of the displacements at xi and xj are orthogonal, and for the rest of
the components they are aligned. Therefore, when we interpolate between g (xi)
and g (xj) there is again no cancellation, i.e. ‖g (x)‖∞ = Ω (‖g (xi)‖∞) = Ω (1).
Finally, recall that the displacement on each facet is O (1)-Lipschitz, and the
displacements agree on the intersection of the facets. Therefore the interpolated
displacement is O (1)-Lipschitz over the entire subcube by a triangle-inequality
argument.
The home subcube is defined using (1) as if the tube enters from above, i.e.
coming down the (2n+ 2)-dimension, and exits through another facet (in one of
the first (2n+ 1) dimensions) in the direction of the path (here again we have
‖g (x)‖∞ = Ω (1)). For all other starting and end points, we define g (x) =
δξ2n+2 on the facet opposite the one that continues the tube, and interpolate
between the opposite facets using Cartesian interpolation. Notice that this gives
a fixed point when the interpolation cancels the default displacement at the
opposite facet, with the displacement −δξ2n+2 at the point on the tube facet
which is at distance h/8 above the path.
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Figure 2: A facet of the Hirsch et al construction
An illustration of the displacement on a facet between two subcubes in a tube;
the direction of the path is into the paper. In the center, the displacement
points into the paper; slightly further outside, the displacement points towards
the center; further outside, the displacement points out of the paper; finally in
the outer layer, the displacements points in the special 2n+ 2 dimension.
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4.2.4 Outside the picture
For all points in the frame and below the slice, the displacement points directly
upward, i.e. g (x) = δξ2n+2. Moving above the slice, let z [top] be the point on
the top facet of the hypercube which is directly above the center of the home
subcube. For all points 〈r,p〉z[top] on the top facet of the hypercube, define the
displacement as follows:
g
(
〈r,p〉z[top]
)
=
−δξ2n+2 r = 0−δp r ≥ h/8
and interpolate for r ∈ (0, h/8). Notice that this displacement is O (1)-Lipschitz
and has Ω (1) magnitude for each r, and this is preserved after interpolation.
Notice that the definition of g on the slice from the previous subsection,
implies that all the points in the top facet of the slice, except for the top of the
home subcube, point directly upwards. Let z [home] denote the center of the
top facet of the home subcube. We therefore have that for any 〈r,p〉
z[home] in
the top facet of the slice,
g
(
〈r,p〉
z[home]
)
=

−δξ2n+2 r = 0
−δp r = h/8
δξ2n+2 r ≥ h/4
where we again interpolate radially for r in (0, h/8) and (h/8, h/4).
Finally, to complete the construction above the slice, simply interpolate (us-
ing Cartesian interpolation) between the top facets of the slice and the hyper-
cube. See also illustration in Figure 3.
5 From Brouwer to -Gcircuit
Proposition 1. There exists a constant  > 0 such that -Gcircuit is PPAD-
complete.
Proof. We continue to denote the hard Brouwer function by f : [0, 1]2n+2 →
[0, 1]2n+2, and its associated displacement by g (y) = f (y) − y. We design a
generalized circuit S that computes f , and verifies that the output is equal to
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Figure 3: Outside the picture
picturehome
An illustration of the displacement outside the picture.
the input. We show that every -approximate solution to S corresponds to an
O
(
1/4
)
-approximate fixed point of f .
Recall that the construction from Section (4) divides the hypercube into
equal-sized subcubes (of length 1/4). Furthermore, all the paths in H are em-
bedded in the 22n+1 subcubes that belong to the picture. For ease of exposi-
tion, we present a construction that only works for points in the picture, i.e.
y ∈ [1/4, 3/4]2n+1 × [1/4, 1/2]. It is straightforward how to use the same ideas
to extend the circuit to deal with all y ∈ [0, 1]2n+2.
The most challenging part of the construction is the extraction of the in-
formation about the local subcube: is it part of a tube? if so, which are the
entrance and exit facets? This is done by extracting the binary representation
of the current subcube, and feeding it to the (Boolean) circuit that computes H
(recall that H is our collection of paths and cycles from Section (4.1)). Notice
that whenever we have valid logic bits, i.e. x [b] <  or x [b] > 1 − , we can
perform logic operations on them without increasing the error.
Once we know the behavior of the path on the current subcube, we simply
have to locally implement the mapping from the previous section, for which
we have a closed form description, using the available gates in the definition of
generalized circuits. Since this definition does not include multiplication and
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division, we implement multiplication and division in Algorithms 2 and 3 in
Subsection 5.1.
Our construction has four parts: (1) equiangle sampling segment, (2) com-
puting the displacement, (3) summing the displacement vectors, and (4) closing
the loop. The first part contains a new idea introduced in this paper: using a
constant size sample. The second part is a more technical but straightforward
description of the implementation of the closed-form mapping by approximate
gates. The third and fourth parts are essentially identical to [CDT09].
5.1 Subroutines
In this subsection we show how to implement a few useful subroutines using the
gates in the definition of -Gcircuit.
5.1.1 If-Else
We begin by describing how to implement a simple if-else. Similar ideas can be
used to implement more involved cases such as (1).
Claim 1. In any -approximate solution to If-Else(| a, b, c | d),
x [d] =
x [c]±O () if x [a] <
√

x [b]±O () if x [a] > 1−√
.
Algorithm 1 If-Else(| a, b, c | d)
1. G¬ (| a | a)# a is the negation of a
2. G− (| b, a | b′)# b′ is (approximately) equal to b iff a = 1
3. G¬
(| a | a)# a is the roudning of a to {0, 1}
4. G−
(| c, a | c′)# c′ is (approximately) equal to c iff a = 0
5. G− (| b′, c′ | d)
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Proof. By definition of G¬, we have that
x [a] =
1±  if x [a] <
√

0±  if x [a] > 1−√
.
Therefore by definition of G−,
x [b′] =
0±O () if x [a] <
√

x [b]±O () if x [a] > 1−√
.
Similarly,
x [c′] =
x [c]±O () if x [a] <
√

0±O () if x [a] > 1−√
.
Finally, the claim follows by definition of G+.
5.1.2 Multiply
Claim 2. In any -approximate solution to Multiply(| a, b | c),
x [c] = x [a] · x [b]±O (√) .
Proof. For any k, the first gate implies that
x [ζk] = k
√
± .
The second gate thus gives
x [ak] =
0±  ifx [a] > k
√
+O ()
1±  ifx [a] < k√−O () .
(2)
Notice that the above equation is ambiguous for at most one value of k. In
particular, ∑
k
(1− x [ak])
√
 = x [a]±O (√) . (3)
We also have
x [dk] = x [b] ·
√
± .
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Algorithm 2 Multiply(| a, b | c)
1. Gζ (0 || h0)
2. for each k ∈ [1/√]:
(a) Gζ (k
√
 || ζk), G< (| a, ζk | ak)
# The vector (ak) is the unary representation of a∑
k : x[ak]<
√
 = max
k : x[ak]<
k
√
 = x [a]±O (√)
(b) G×ζ (
√
 | b | dk)
# The vector (dk) is simply equal to b ·
√
 everywhere.
∑
k : x[ak]<
x [dk] =
 ∑
k : x[ak]<1−
√

·x [b]±O (√) = x [a]·x [b]±O (√)
(c) G− (| dk, ak | ek)
# The vector (ek) is b ·
√
 only when (ak) < .∑
k : x[ak]<
x [ek] = x [a] · x [b]±O
(√

)
(d) G+ (| hk−1, ek | hk)
# Finally, we sum the ek’s to get a · b
x
[
h1/√
]
= x [a] · x [b]±O (√)
3. G=
(| h1/√ | c)
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The subtraction gate zeros x [dk] for all k such that x [a] < k
√
−O (), and has
negligible effect for k such that x [a] > k
√
+O ():
x [ek] =
x [b] ·
√
± 2 ifx [a] > k√+O ()
0± 2 ifx [a] < k√−O () .
The sum of the x [ek]’s satisfies:∑
k
x [ek] = x [a] · x [b]±O
(√

)
,
where we have an error of ±O (√) arising from aggregating ±2 for 1/√ dis-
tinct k’s, and another ±O (√) from (3).
By induction, each hk is approximately equal to the sum of the first x [ej]’s:
x [hk] =
k∑
j=1
x [ej]± k.
In particular, we have
x
[
h1/√
]
=
∑
k
x [ek]±
√

= x [a] · x [b]±O (√) .
5.1.3 Divide
Claim 3. In any -approximate solution to Divide(| a, b | c),
x [c] · x [b] = x [a]±O (√) .
Notice that for Algorithm 3, in any -approximate solution, x [c] = x [a] /x [b]±
O (
√
) /x [b]; when x [b] and  are bounded away from 0, this is only a constant
factor increase in the error.
Proof. For each k, we have
x [bk] = k
√
 · x [b]± .
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Algorithm 3 Divide(| a, b | c)
1. Gζ (0 || h0)
2. for each k ∈ [1/√]:
(a) G×ζ (k
√
 | b | bk), G< (| bk, a | dk)
# The vector (dk) is the unary representation of a/b ∑
k : x[dk]>
√

 · x [b] = ( max
k : x[dk]>
k
√

)
· x [b] = x [a]±O (√)
(b) G×ζ (
√
 | dk | ek)
# The vector (ek) is a (
√
)-scaled version of (dk)(∑
x [ek]
)
· x [b] = x [a]±O (√)
(c) G+ (| hk−1, ek | hk)
# Finally, we sum the ek’s
x
[
h1/√
] · x [b] = x [a]±O (√)
3. G=
(| h1/√ | c)
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Thus also
x [dk] =
1±  ifx [a] > k
√
 · x [b] +O ()
0±  ifx [a] < k√ · x [b]−O () .
Notice that x [dk] is ambiguous for at most k. Furthermore, aggregating the ±
error over 1/
√
 distinct k’s, we have:∑
x [dk] ·
√
x [b] = x [a]±O (√) .
x [ek]’s are a step closer to what we need:
x [ek] = x [dk]
√
± ,
and therefore also ∑
x [ek] · x [b] = x [a]±O
(√

)
. (4)
Finally, by induction
x
[
h1/√
]
=
∑
x [ek]±
√
,
and the claim follows by plugging into (4).
5.1.4 Max
Claim 4. In any -approximate solution to Max(| a1, . . . an | b),
x [b] = maxx [ai]±O
(√

)
.
Proof. Similarly to (2), we have that for each i, k
x [ck,i] =
0±  ifx [ai] < k
√
−O ()
1±  ifx [ai] > k
√
+O () .
For each k, taking OR of all the ck,i’s gives (approximately) 1 iff any of the
x [ai]’s is sufficiently large; in particular if the maximum is:
x [dk,n] =
0±  if maxi x [ai] < k
√
−O ()
1±  if maxi x [ai] > k
√
+O () .
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Algorithm 4 Max(| a1, . . . an | b)
1. Gζ (0 || h0)
2. for each k ∈ [1/√]:
(a) Gζ (k
√
 || ζk)
(b) Gζ (0 || dk,0)
(c) for each i ∈ [n]:
i. G< (| ζk, ai | ck,i)
# The vector (ck,i)k is the unary representation of ai:
∀i
(
max
k : x[ck,i]>
k
√

)
= x [ai]±O
(√

)
ii. G∨ (| dk,i−1, ck,i | dk,i)
# The vector (dk,n) is the unary representation of max ai:(
max
k : x[dk,n]>
k
√

)
= maxx [ai]±O
(√

)
(d) G×ζ (
√
 | dk,n | ek)
# The vector (ek) is a (
√
)-scaled version of (dk)(∑
x [ek]
)
= maxx [ai]±O
(√

)
(e) G+ (| hk−1, ek | hk)
# Finally, we sum the ek’s
x
[
h1/√
]
= maxx [ai]±O
(√

)
3. G=
(| h1/√ | b)
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Therefore also (similarly to (3)),∑
k
x [dk,n]
√
 = max
i
x [ai]±O
(√

)
.
The x [ek] take care of scaling by
√
:∑
k
x [ek] = max
i
x [ai]±O
(√

)
.
Finally, by induction,
x
[
h1/√
]
= maxx [ai]±O
(√

)
.
5.1.5 Interpolate
Claim 5. In any -approximate solution to Interpolate(a, wa, b, wb | c),
x [c] (x [wa] + x [wb]) = (x [wa] · x [a] + x [wb] · x [b])±O
(√

)
.
Proof. By Claim 3, we have
x [wa] · (x [wa] + x [wb]) = x [wa]±O
(√

)
x [wb] · (x [wa] + x [wb]) = x [wb]±O
(√

)
.
Therefore, by Claim 2,
x [ca] · (x [wa] + x [wb]) = x [wa] · x [c]±O
(√

)
x [cb] · (x [wa] + x [wb]) = x [wb] · x [c]±O
(√

)
.
The claim follows by definition of G+.
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Algorithm 5 Interpolate(a, wa, b, wb | c)
1. G×ζ
(
1/2 | wa | wa/2
)
and G×ζ
(
1/2 | wb | wb/2
)
# We divide by 2 before adding in order to stay in [0, 1]
2. G+
(| wa/2, wb/2 | wa/2+b/2) Add the weights
3. Divide
(| wa/2, wa/2+b/2 | wa) and Divide(| wb/2, wa/2+b/2 | wb),
# wa and wb are the normalized weights:
x [wa] · (x [wa] + x [wb]) = x [wa]±O
(√

)
4. Multiply(| wa, a | ca) and Multiply(| wb, b | cb)
# ca and cb are the a and b components, respectively, of c:
x [ca] = x [wa] · x [a] / (x [wa] + x [wb])±O
(√

)
/ (x [wa] + x [wb])
5. G+ (| ca, cb | c)
# Finally, c is the interpolation of a and b:
x [c] = (x [wa] · x [a] + x [wb] · x [b]) / (x [wa] + x [wb])
±O (√) / (x [wa] + x [wb])
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5.2 Equiangle sampling segment
The first information we require in order to compute the Hirsch et al mapping
f (y) is about the subcube to which y belongs: is it part of the tube? if so,
which are the entrance and exit facets? In order to answer those questions, we
extract the binary representation of the cube. Recall that our circuit uses brittle
comparators; thus when y is close to a facet between subcubes, the behaviour
of the brittle comparators may be unpredictable. We start with the easy case,
where y is actually far from every facet:
Definition 4. We say that y is an interior point if for every i, |yi − 1/2| > ;
otherwise, we say that y is a boundary point.
A very nice property of the Hirsch et al construction is that whenever y
is at the intersection of two or more facets, the displacement is the same:
g (y) = δξ2n+2. Thus, by the Lipschitz property of g, whenever y is close to
the intersection of two or more facets, the displacement is approximately δξ2n+2.
For such y’s, we don’t care to which subcube they belong.
Definition 5. We say that y is a corner point if there exist distinct i, j ∈ [2n+ 2]
such that |yi − 1/2| < 1/4 and |yj − 1/2| < 1/4.
(Notice that y may be an interior point and a corner point at the same time.)
We still have a hard time handling y’s which are neither an interior point nor
a corner point. To mitigate the effect of such y’s we use an equiangle averaging
scheme. Namely we consider the set:
E (y) =
{
yl = y + (6l · )1 : 0 ≤ l < 1/√}
where 1 denotes the all-ones vector. Notice that since g is λ-Lipschitz for con-
stant λ, g
(
yl
)
will be approximately the same for all yl ∈ E (y).
Fact 2. If any yl ∈ E (y) is not a corner point, then at most one yl′ ∈ E (y)
is a boundary point.
Proof. For each dimension, at most one element in E (y) can be -close to the
(1/2) facet. Thus if two elements in E (y) are boundary points, it must be
because of distinct dimensions - and therefore every yl is a corner point.
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Given input y, we compute the displacement g (·) separately and in parallel
for each yl ∈ E, and average at the end. Since at most one yl is a boundary
point, this will incur an error of at most
√
.
In the generalized circuit we can construct E using (1/
√
) auxiliary nodes
and Gζ and G+ gates:
x
[
yli
]
= min
{
x
[
y0i
]
+ (6l · ) , 1}± 2
5.3 Computing the displacement
For each yl ∈ E, we construct a disjoint circuit that approximates the dis-
placement g
(
yl
)
. In the description of the circuit below we omit the index
l.
Lemma 2. The circuit below O (
√
)-approximately simulates the computation
of the Hirsch et al displacement:
1. Whenever (x [yi])i∈[2n+2] is an interior point,
x
[
g+i
]− x [g−i ] = gi (x [y])±O (1/4)
2. Furthermore, whenever (x [yi])i∈[2n+2] is a corner point,
x
[
g+2n+2
]− x [g−2n+2] = δ ±O (√)
and ∀i < 2n+ 2:
x
[
g+i
]− x [g−i ] = 0±O (√)
Proof. We construct the circuit in five stages: (1) given y, we extract b, that
is the binary representation of the corresponding subcube in {0, 1}2n+2; (2)
we then compute whether b belongs to a path in H, and if so which are the
previous and next vertices; (3) we compute the centers of the coordinate systems
corresponding to the entrance and exit facets, and label them zin and zout; (4)
we project y to each facet, and transform this projection to the local polar
coordinate systems - (rin,pin); and (5) finally, we use all the information above
to compute the displacement g = g (y).
The correctness of Lemma 2 follows from Claims 6-12.
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Extract b ∈ {0, 1}2n+2
Our first step is to extract the binary vector b which represents the subcube to
which y belongs. In other words we want bi to be the indicator of yi < 1/2.
We do that by adding the following gadgets: Gζ
(
1/2 || c1/2
)
and, for each i,
G<
(| yi, c1/2 | bi). Observe that now
x [bi] =
0±  x [yi] < x
[
c1/2
]− 
1±  x [yi] > x
[
c1/2
]
+ 
Claim 6. If x [y] is an interior point, x [b] is the correct representation (up to 
error) of the corresponding bits in {0, 1}2n+2.
Neighbors in H
Given x [b] we can construct, using G∧’s and G¬’s and a polynomial number of
unused nodes, the circuits SH and PH that give the next and previous vertex
visited by our collection of paths, H. The output of each circuit is represented
by 2n+ 2 unused nodes
{
PHi (b)
}
and
{
SHi (b)
}
.
Recall that H is defined in {0, 1}2n+1, so the last input bit is simply ignored
(inside the picture it is always 0); the last output bit is used as follows. Our
convention is that starting points and end points correspond to PH (b) = b
and SH (b) = b, respectively, and likewise for points that do not belong to any
path. An exception to this is the 0 starting point, which will correspond to
PH (0) = (02n+1; 1): This is in accordance with the Hirsch et al construction,
where the home subcube is constructed as if it continues a path from the subcube
above it.
Claim 7. If x [b] is an -approximate binary vector, i.e. x [b] ∈ ([0, ] ∪ [1− , 1])2n+2,
then x
[
PH (b)
]
and x
[
SH (b)
]
correctly represent (up to  error) the previous
vertex and next vertex in H.
Entrance and exit facets
Let b+ini = bi ∧ ¬PHi (b), i.e. b+ini is 1 if the path enters the current subcube
via the positive i-th direction; define b−ini analogously. Let bini denote the OR of
b+ini and b
−in
i .
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The center of the entrance facet is constructed via Gζ , G×ζ , G+, and G−
according to the formula:
zini =

1/2− h/2 bini = 0 AND bi = 0
1/2 + h/2 bini = 0 AND bi = 1
1/2 bini = 1
Construct zout analogously.
Notice that if we know on which coordinate the path enters, in {0, 1}2n+2 it
has only one possible direction; in the Hirsch et al hypercube this corresponds
to always entering from the center (i.e. from the yi = 1/2 facet). Also, if b
corresponds to a non-trivial starting point bin = 0 and zin is simply the center
of the subcube (and similarly for bout, zout when b is an end point).
Claim 8. If x [b], x
[
PH (b)
]
, and x
[
SH (b)
]
are -approximate binary vectors,
then x [zin] and x [zout] are O ()-approximations to the centers of the entrance
facet and exit facets, respectively.
Max-norm polar coordinates
We are now ready to compute the local max-norm polar coordinates of the
projections of y on the entrance and exit facets.
The max-norm radius is given by
rin = max
i : bini =0
∣∣zini − yi∣∣
Finding the maximum of a (length 2n+1) vector requires some care when on
each gate we can incur a constant error, the details are described in Algorithm
4.
The direction (max-norm) unit-vector, p, is given by
pini =
(
zini − yi
)
/rin
Division is computed using Divide, introducing an error of O (
√
/rin); this
approximation suffices because for rin < h/8, we multiply pini by rin when we
interpolate. Also, we will use two nodes for each pini to represent the positive
and negative values. We do the same for (rout,pout).
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Claim 9. If x [y] is an interior point, then x [rin] and x [rout] areO (
√
)-approximations
to the distances of x [y] from x [zin] and x [zout], respectively. Furthermore,
x [pin] and x [pout] are O (
√
/x [rin])- and O (
√
/x [rout])- to the unit-length
vectors that point from x [y] in the directions of x [zin] and x [zout], respectively.
The final displacement
Given pin and bin, we can compute gin for the special values of rin. Recall that
gin
(〈
rin,pin
〉)
=

δ (b+in − b−in) rin = 0
−δpin rin = h/8
δ (b−in − b+in) rin = h/4
δξ2n+2 r
in = h/2
We use Algorithm 5 to interpolate for intermediate values of rin. We also
need to interpolate between gin and gout. The ratio at which we interpolate is
exactly the ratio between the distance of y from the entrance and exit facets. We
label the positive and negative components of this last interpolation g(interior)+
and g(interior)−, respectively.
When y is close to both facets, the interpolation may be inaccurate; however,
in this case it is a corner point. (We remark that this seems to be the only part
of the proof which requires us to set the threshold for a corner point and the
final error at Θ
(
1/4
)
rather than Θ (
√
); this issue may be avoidable by a more
careful construction of Algorithms 3 and 5.)
Claim 10. If x [y] is an interior point of an intermediate subcube in the tube,
and it is not a corner point, then
(
x
[
g(interior)+
]− x [g(interior)−]) is a O (1/4)-
approximation of the Hirsch et al displacement g (x [y]).
Corner points We must ensure that if y is a corner point, we set g(corner)+ =
δξ2n+2 and g(corner)− = 0: check over all pairs of coordinates whether |x [yi]− 1/2| <
21/4 and |x [yj]− 1/2| < 21/4. Let z be the variable representing the OR
of those
(
2n+2
2
)
indicators. Interpolate (e.g. using Algorithm 5) between the(
g(interior)+,g(interior)−
)
we computed earlier and δξ2n+2 with weights z and ¬z.
Label the result of the interpolation
(
g(tube)+,g(tube)−
)
.
We remark that whenever z is ambiguous, i.e. the second smallest |x [yi]− 1/2|
is very close to 21/4, then we cannot predict the value of x [z]; it can take any
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value in [0, 1]. Nevertheless, in this case x [y] is not a corner point, thus for most
yl ∈ E, x [yl] is an interior point. This means that by Claim 10, we would com-
pute the (approximately) correct interior displacement
(
x
[
g(interior)+
]− x [g(interior)−]).
Since x [y] is close to a corner point, this value is very close to δξ2n+2 =(
x
[
g(corner)+
]− x [g(corner)−]). Therefore, although we don’t know the value
of x [z], we use it to interpolate between two (approximately) equal vectors - so
the result is guaranteed to be (approximately) correct regardless of the value of
x [z].
Claim 11. If x [y] is a corner point, then
(
x
[
g(tube)+
]− x [g(tube)−]) is a O (√)-
approximation of δξ2n+2, and thus also a O
(
1/4
)
-approximation of the Hirsch et
al displacement g (x [y]). Furthermore, Claim 10 continues to hold for
(
g(tube)+,g(tube)−
)
.
Start/end subcubes and subcubes outside the tube For start/end sub-
cubes (except the home subcube) we use a slightly different (Cartesian) interpo-
lation that yields a fixed point in the center of the subcube, and a displacement
of δξ2n+2 on all facets but the exit/entrance facet, respectively. For subcubes in
the picture but outside the tube, we again set g = δξ2n+2.
Notice that we can infer the type of subcube from the following two-bits
vector:
T =
(∨ibini ,∨ibouti )
If T = (0, 0), the subcube is outside the tube; when T = (0, 1), we are at a
start subcube, while T = (1, 0) corresponds to an end subcube; T = (1, 1) is an
intermediate subcube in the tube. Finally, interpolate between the displacement
for each type of subcube using T and ¬T ; label the result of the interpolation
(g+,g−).
Claim 12. If x [y] is either an interior point or a corner point, of any subcube
in the slice, then (x [g+]− x [g−]) is an O (1/4)-approximation of the Hirsch et
al displacement g (x [y]).
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5.4 Summing the displacement vectors
We are now ready to average over the displacement vectors we computed for
each yl. Using G×ζ and G+ we have that
x
[
g+i
]
=
1/
√
∑
l=1
(√
x
[
gl+i
])±O (√) and x [g−i ] = 1/
√
∑
l=1
(√
x
[
gl−i
])±O (√)
Lemma 3. For every input x [y] and every i ∈ [2n+ 2],
x
[
g+i
]− x [g−i ] = gi (x [y])±O (1/4)
Proof. By Fact 2, every yl ∈ E, except at most one, is either an interior point
or a corner point. By Lemma 2, for all those yl,
(
x
[
g+li
]− x [g−li ]) is at most
O
(
1/4
)
-far from the right displacement. The single point which is neither an
interior point nor a corner point increases the error by at most O (
√
), as does
the summation above. Finally, because g is λ-Lipschitz for constant λ, the error
added due to the distance between the yl’s is again at most O (
√
).
5.5 Closing the loop
Finally, for each i ∈ [2n+ 2]: G+
(| y1i , g+i | y′i), G+ (| y′i, g−i | y′′i ) andG= (| y′′i | y1i ).
6 -Gcircuit with fan-out 2
In the previous section, we proved that -Gcircuit is PPAD-complete for some
constant  > 0. Each generalized circuit gate has fan-in at most 2, which would
eventually correspond to a bound on the incoming degree of each player in the
graphical game. In order to bound the total degree (as well as for the application
to A-CEEI), we need to also bound fan-out of each gate.
Theorem 2 (Generalized circuit). There exists a constant  > 0 such that -
Gcircuit with fan-out 2 is PPAD-complete.
Proof. We present a black-box reduction that converts a general ′-Gcircuit in-
stance to an instance of -Gcircuit with fan-out 2, for ′ = Θ (
√
). Daskalakis
et al [DGP09] bound the fan-out of the generalized circuit by introducing a bi-
nary tree of G= gates. Unfortunately, this blows up the error: each G= gate
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Algorithm 6 Real2Unary
(| a | b1, . . . b4/′)
1. G= (| a | c0)
2. for each k ∈ [4/′]:
(a) G= (| ck−1 | ck)
# The ck’s are simply copies of a, ensuring that each gate has fan-out
at most 2:
∀k x [ck] = x [a]± (k + 1) 
(b) Gζ (k′/4 || ζk)
(c) G< (| ζk, ck | bk)
# The vector (bk) is the unary representation of a:
∀i
(
max
k : x[bk]>
k′/4
)
= x [a]± ′/2
introduces an additive error of , so the increase is proportional to the depth of
the tree, i.e. Θ ( · log n). While this was acceptable for [DGP09] who used an
exponentially small , it clearly fails in our setting.
We overcome this obstacle by resorting to logical gates (G<, G∨, G∧, and in
particular G¬). Recall that the logical gates are at most ′-far from the correct
Boolean value. Therefore, concatenating multiple logical gates does not amplify
the error. In particular, if any logical gate has a large fan-out, we can distribute
its output using a binary tree of G¬ gates (we use trees of even depth). When
the gate is arithmetic (Gζ , G×ζ , G=, G+, or G−), we convert its output to
unary representation over Θ (′) logical gates (Algorithm 6). Then, we copy the
unary representation using trees of G¬ gates. Finally, we use G×ζ and G+ gates
to convert each copy of the unary representation back to a real value in [0, 1]
(Algorithm 7).
It is interesting to note that for constant  and ′, the unary representation
has constant size, so the number of new gates is proportional to the original
fan-out (i.e. the number of leaves of the binary tree that copies the unary
representation). In particular this reduction increases the size of the circuit by
a factor of Θ (1/′).
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Algorithm 7 Unary2Real
(| b1, . . . b4/′ | a′)
1. Gζ (0 || d0)
2. for each k ∈ [4/′]:
(a) G×ζ (′/4 | bk | ck)
# The sum of the ck’s is approximately a:∑
x [ck] = x [a]± (′/2 +  · 4/′)
(b) G+ (| dk−1, ck | dk)
3. G= (| dk | a′)
# a′ approximately recovers the original a:
x [a′] = x [a]± ′
7 From -Gcircuit to 2-ANE
The last step in our proof is to reduce the problem of finding an -approximate
solution to the generalized circuit to that of finding an Θ (2)-ANE. First, we re-
duce to the problem of finding an -WSNE in a (polymatrix, degree 3) graphical
game. This reduction is implicit in Daskalakis et al [DGP09]5.
Definition 6. Given a polymatrix game over a degree d graph with k actions
for each player, -WSNE-Polymatrix(d, k) is the problem of finding an -Well
Supported Nash Equilibrium.
Theorem. (Essentially [DGP09]) 2-Gcircuit with fan-out 2 ≤P -WSNE-
Polymatrix(3, 2)
Daskalakis et al construct a different gadget for each type of gate. For
example, we describe their gadget for the G×ζ gate below.
5In [DGP09], polymatrix games are called games with additive utility functions.
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Lemma 4. (G×ζ gadget, [DGP09])
Let v1,v2, and w be players in a graphical game, and suppose that the payoffs
of v2 and w are as follows.
Payoff for v2:
w plays 0 w plays 1
v2 plays 0 0 1
v2 plays 1 1 0
Payoffs for w:
game with v1:
v1 plays 0 v1plays 1
w plays 0 0 ζ
w plays 1 0 0
game with v2:
v2 plays 0 v2plays 1
w plays 0 0 0
w plays 1 0 1
Then, in every -WSNE p [v2] = min (ζp [v1] , 1) ± , where p [u] denotes the
probability that u assigns to strategy 1.
Proof. (Sketch) If p [v2] > ζp [v1] + , then in every -WSNE p [w] = 1, which
contradicts p [v2] > . Similarly, if p [v2] < min (ζp [v1] , 1) − , then p [w] = 0,
which yields a contradiction when p [v2] < 1− .
7.1 From
√
-WSNE to Θ ()-ANE
The reduction above shows hardness for the slightly stronger notion (therefore
weaker hardness) of -WSNE. Daskalakis et al [DGP09] show a reduction from√
-WSNE to Θ ()-ANE for games with a constant number of players. It is easy
to see that the same reduction holds for graphical games with constant degree.
We sketch the proof below.
Lemma 5. (Essentially [DGP09]) Given an -ANE of a graphical game with
payoffs in [0, 1] and incoming degree din, we can construct in polynomial time a√
 · (√+ 1 + 4din)-WSNE.
Proof. Let V be the set of players, where each v ∈ V has utility U v and action set
Av. Let x = (xva) ∈ ∆ (×vAv) be an -ANE. Let U va (x−v) denote the expected
payoff for playing a when all other players play according to x. Note that
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U va (x
−v) = U va
(
xNin(v)
)
depends only on the distributions of the players in the
incoming neighborhood of v, which we denote Nin (v). Finally, let U vmax (x−v) =
maxa∈Av U va (x
−v).
Let k = k () > 0 be some large number do be specified later. We construct
our new approximate equilibrium by taking, for each player only the strategies
that are within k of the optimum:
xˆva =

xva
1−zv U
v
a (x
−v) ≥ U vmax (x−v)− k
0 otherwise
where zv is the total probability that player v assigns to strategies that are more
than k away from the optimum.
The above division is well-defined because for k > 1, zv is bounded away
from 1. Moreover, the following claim from [DGP09] formalizes the intuition
that when k is sufficiently large, the total weight on actions removed is small,
so xˆv is close to xv:
Claim 13. (Claim 6 of [DGP09])
∀v ∈ V
∑
a∈Av
|xˆva − xva| ≤
2
k − 1
Now, the total change to the expected payoff to player v for each action a,
is bounded by the total change in mixed strategies of its incoming neighbors:∣∣U va (x−v)− U va (xˆ−v)∣∣ = ∣∣U va (xNin(v))− U va (xˆNin(v))∣∣
≤
∑
a∈AN (v)
∣∣xˆNin(v)a − xNin(v)a ∣∣ ≤ ∑
w∈N (v)
∑
a∈Aw
|xˆwa − xwa | ≤
2din
k − 1
It follows that xˆva is a
(
k+ 4din
k−1
)
-WSNE:
U va
(
xˆ−v
) ≥ U va (x−v)− 2dink − 1 ≥ U vmax (x−v)− k − 2dink − 1 ≥ U vmax (xˆ−v)− k − 4dink − 1
Finally, take k = 1 + 1/
√
 to get that
k+
4din
k − 1 ≤
√
 · (√+ 1 + 4din)
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8 -approximate Bayesian Nash equilibrium
In this section we formally introduce and prove our corollary for -approximate
Bayesian Nash equilibrium in two-player games with incomplete information.
In a game with incomplete information, each player i has a type ti known
only to her, and the players’ types t = (t1, t2) are drawn from a joint distribution
which is known to everyone. The payoff for player i is a function ui (a, ti) of her
own type and all the players’ actions.
Definition 7. (e.g. [SSW04])
In a Bayesian Nash equilibrium, for every player i and every type ti, the
mixed strategy xi (ti) must be a best response in expectation over the other
players’ types and actions:
Et|ti
[
Ea∼(xi(ti),x−i(t−i)) [ui (a; ti)]
] ≥ max
x
′
i(ti)∈∆Ai
Et|ti
[
Ea∼(x′i(ti),x−i(t−i)) [ui (a; ti)]
]
.
Similarly, in an -approximate Bayesian Nash equilibrium, for every player i and
every type ti, the mixed strategy xi (ti) must be an -best response in expectation
over the other players’ types and actions:
Et|ti
[
Ea∼(xi(ti),x−i(t−i)) [ui (a; ti)]
] ≥ max
x
′
i(ti)∈∆Ai
Et|ti
[
Ea∼(x′i(ti),x−i(t−i)) [ui (a; ti)]
]
−.
Before we prove our main corollary for incomplete information games, it is
helpful to prove the following slightly weaker statement, for two players with
many strategies.
Lemma 6. There exists a constant  > 0, such that given a two-player game
with incomplete information where each player has n actions, finding an -
approximate Bayesian Nash equilibrium is PPAD-complete.
Proof. We reduce from a bipartite polymatrix game, and let the typeset for each
of the two players in the incomplete information game correspond to one side
of the bipartite graph. The utility of player i on edge (i, j) of the polymatrix
game depends on her identity (i), as well as the identity (j) of the vertex on
the other side of that edge. We use the types of the incomplete information
game, to encode i. We encode j using the strategies of the second player in the
incomplete information game.
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In more detail, consider a bipartite polymatrix game for which it is PPAD-
hard to compute a 4-approximate Nash equilibrium. Use an affine transforma-
tion to change all the payoffs from [0, 1] to [1/2, 1]. It is PPAD-hard to find a
2-approximate Nash equilibrium in the transformed game.
We now construct the two-player incomplete information game: As we hinted
before, we let the typeset of each player correspond to the vertices on one side of
the bipartite graphical game. Player i has |Ti| types and 2 |Ti| strategies, where
each strategy corresponds to a pair of vertex and strategy for that vertex. If a
player plays a strategy whose vertex does not match her type, her payoff is 0.
Therefore in every -approximate Bayesian Nash equilibrium, every player, on
every type, plays the two strategies that correspond to her type with probability
at least 1− 2.
Let the joint distribution over types be as follows: pick a random edge in
the bipartite graph, and assign the types corresponding to its vertices. When-
ever both players play strategies that match their respective types, their payoffs
are the payoffs in the (transformed) bimatrix game on that edge. In every -
approximate Bayesian Nash equilibrium, every player, on every type, plays a
mixed strategy which is -best response. Since the other player plays strate-
gies that correspond to the correct vertex with probability at least 1 − 2, the
same mixture must be a 2-best response for the vertex player in the bipartite
game.
In order to prove the main corollary, we need to reduce the number of actions
in the above construction. Observe that we don’t need each player to choose
an action that uniquely identifies her type. Rather, it suffices to specify which
neighbor of the other player’s vertex is chosen. This can be done concisely via
a coloring of the vertices such that every pair of vertices of distance exactly
two have different colors; i.e. a coloring of the square of the polymatrix game’s
graph. The squared graph has degree 3 · (3− 1) = 6, and therefore we can
efficiently find a 7-coloring. It suffices for each player to specify one of 7 colors,
together with one of 2 strategies for the vertex with that color. Therefore we
can encode this choice using only 14 strategies.
Corollary 1. There exists a constant  > 0, such that given a two-player game
with incomplete information where each player has 14 actions, finding an -
approximate Bayesian Nash equilibrium is PPAD-complete.
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9 Relative -Well Supported Nash equilibrium
In this section we formally introduce and prove our result for relative -Well
Supported Nash Equilibrium in two-player games.
As we mentioned in Section 3.1, we say that a vector of mixed strategies
x ∈ ×j∆Aj is a Nash equilibrium if every strategy ai in the support of xi is a
best response to the actions of the mixed strategies of the rest of the players,
x−i;
Ea−i∼x−i [ui (ai, a−i)] = max
a′∈Ai
Ea−i∼x−i [ui (a′, a−i)] .
In this section, we study the multiplicative relaxation of this condition. Namely,
Definition 8. We say that x is a relative -Well Supported Nash Equilibrium
(relative -WSNE) if each ai in the support of xi is a relative -best response to
x−i. I.e. ∀ai ∈ Supp (xi),
Ea−i∼x−i [ui (ai, a−i)] ≥ (1− ) max
a′∈Ai
Ea−i∼x−i
[
ui
(
a
′
, a−i
)]
.
Corollary 2 (Relative -WSNE). There exists a constant  > 0 such that finding
a relative -Well Supported Nash Equilibrium in a bimatrix game with positive
payoffs is PPAD-complete.
Proof. We reduce from a bipartite, degree 3, polymatrix game (Theorem 1). The
payoff bimatrix is the sum of a main game that simulates the polymatrix game
and an imitation game that forces the two players to randomize (approximately)
uniformly across all the polymatrix game nodes.
Main game As in the reduction to games of incomplete information, let each
player “control” the nodes on one side of the bipartite game graph. Namely,
let n be the number nodes on each side of the graph; each player has 2n
actions, each corresponding to a choice of a node and an action for that
node. (We assume without loss of generality that the number of nodes
is equal and every node has exactly 3 neighbors.) When the players play
strategies that correspond to adjacent nodes in the graphs, they receive
the payoffs of the corresponding nodes, scaled by a small positive constant,
e.g. η = 0.01, to fit in [0, η]. If the nodes played do not share an edge in
the bipartite game graph, the utility for both players is zero.
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Imitation game We also let the players play a hide-and-seek game with payoffs
in {0, 1} over a space of n actions. Fix an arbitrary ordering over the
nodes on each side of the polymatrix game; action i in the imitation game
corresponds to the two rows (respectively, two columns) for node i in the
main game. The row player tries to imitate the column player; namely her
payoff is 1 if they both play their respective node i, and 0 otherwise. The
column player tries to imitate the row player +1; her payoff is 1 if the row
player plays node i, and she plays node i+1 (mod n) (we henceforth drop
the (mod n) for simplicity of notation).
Structure and value of a relative -WSNE
We first claim that in every relative -WSNE (x, y), the two players random-
ize approximately uniformly across all their nodes. Let x (i) denote the total
probability that the row player assigns to node i, and analogously for y (i).
Lemma 7. In every (x, y) relative -WSNE, x (i) , y (i) ∈ [(1− 4η) /n, (1 + 5η) /n] ∀i.
Proof. Let tR = maxi x (i) and i∗R = arg maxi x (i); we first observe that if
x (j) ≤ (1− 4η) tR < (1− − 3η) tR, then y (j + 1) = 0. The column player’s
payoff from the imitation game, when playing node j+ 1, is at most x (j), while
from the main game she can gain at most x (k) · η for each row player’s node
k in the neighborhood of the column player’s j + 1. Since each node has only
three neighbors and they all satisfy x (k) ≤ tR, her payoff for playing either
strategy of node j + 1 is bounded by x (j) + 3tR · η < (1− ) tR. However,
she can guarantee a payoff of at least tR by playing node i∗R; therefore by the
well-supported condition, y (j + 1) = 0. Similarly, if we let tC = maxi y (i), then
whenever y (j) ≤ (1− 4η) tC , x (j) = 0.
Next, we claim that both players have full support in the imitation game,
i.e. x (i) , y (i) > 0 ∀i ∈ [n]. Assume by contradiction that this is false, and let,
without loss of generality, x (i) = 0. Since x (i) < (1− 4η) /n ≤ (1− 4η) tR, we
also have y (i+ 1) = 0. However, this implies x (i+ 1) = 0, which in turn implies
y (i+ 2) = 0, and so forth. By induction we get that x (i) , y (i) = 0 ∀i ∈ [n],
which of course cannot be true as their sum is 1.
Therefore, for every i ∈ [n], we also have that
x (i) > (1− 4η) tR ≥ (1− 4η)Ejx (j) = (1− 4η) /n, (5)
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and similarly y (i) > (1− 4η) /n.
Finally, we claim that the maximum probability assigned to any node is at
most tR, tC ≤ 1/ ((1− 4η)n) < (1 + 5η) /n. Otherwise, Eix (i) < (1− 4η) tR,
which in particular implies that for some i ∈ [n], x (i) < (1− 4η) tR, violating
(5)
Corollary 6. In every (x, y) relative -WSNE, the expected utilities of both
players for playing any strategy is in [(1− 4η) /n, (1 + 9η) /n].
Completing the proof of Corollary 2
Given a relative -WSNE (x, y), we can take, for each node i, the mixed strategy
induced by the probabilities x (i : 1) /x (i) and x (i : 2) /x (i) that the row player
assigns to each action (respectively, y (j : 1) /y (j) and y (j : 2) /y (j) assigned
by the column player). We claim that this strategy profile is an ′-approximate
equilibrium for the polymatrix game for some small constant ′ = Θ () (which
is PPAD-hard to find by Theorem 1).
Assume by contradiction that this is not the case. Then without loss of gen-
erality there exists a node i which is controlled by the row player, and, under the
induced strategy profile, can improve her payoff by ′ by deviating from strategy
1 to strategy 2. Therefore in the two player game, the expected payoff to the
row player from playing x (i : 2) is greater than the payoff from playing x (i : 1)
by at least ′ · η · 1
n
· (1−O (η)). (We multiply ′ by the scaling factor η and the
probability 1
n
· (1−O (η)) of observing any of its neighbors.) Yet, by Corollary
6 the total payoff from playing x (i : 2) is at most (1 + 9η) /n. Therefore, the
row player improves her expected payoff by a factor of 1 + Ω (′ · η) ≥ 1 + 2
when deviating from x (i : 1) to x (i : 2) - but this contradicts our assumption
that (x, y) is a relative -WSNE.
10 Non-monotone markets
In this section we formally introduce our result for non-monotone markets, dis-
cuss it, and compare it to the original result of Chen, Paparas, and Yannakakis
[CPY13]. A sketch of the proof appears in Appendix A.
Intuitively, a market is monotone if increasing the price of some good, while
fixing the rest of the prices, never increases the excess demand for that good.
Formally, we have the following definition by Chen et al:
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Definition 9. ([CPY13]) Let M be a market with k ≥ 2 goods. We say that
M is non-monotone at price vector pi if there exist c > 0, and a good g1 such
that:
• the excess demand Z1 (y1, . . . yk) is a continuous function (rather than
correspondence) over y ∈ B (pi, c);
• Z1 (pi) > 0;
• the partial derivative of ∂Z1/∂y1 exists and is continuous over B (pi, c);
• and ∂Z1/∂y1 (pi) > 0.
We say that a market M is non-monotone if there exists such a rational price
vector pi ≥ 0, and Z1 (pi) is moderately computable; i.e. for any γ > 0, Z1 (pi)
can be approximated to within γ in time polynomial in 1/γ.
In general we want to talk about non-monotone families of utility functions,
i.e. ones that support non-monotone markets. Formally,
Definition 10. ([CPY13]) We say that a family U of utility functions is non-
monotone if:
• U is countable;
• if u : [0,∞)k → R is in U , then so is u′ (x1, . . . xm) = a ·u (xl1/b1, . . . xlk/bk)
for any indices l1, . . . , lk ∈ [m] and positive (rational) a, b1, . . . , bk;
• u (x) = g∗ (xi) is in U for some strictly increasing g : [0,∞)→ R; and
• there exists a non-monotone market MU with utilities from U .
We need to include one more definition: that of -tight market equilibrium.
Definition 11. A price vector pi is an -tight approximate market equilibrium
of M if there exists a z ∈ Z (pi) (the excess demand at pi) such that for every
good j, |zj| ≤ Wj, where Wj is the sum of the endowments of good j.
Our main result for non-monotone markets equilibria is now formally defined:
Corollary 3 (Non-monotone markets). Let U be any non-monotone family of
utility functions. There exists a constant U > 0 such that given a market M
where the utility of each trader is either linear or taken from U , finding an
U -tight approximate market equilibrium is PPAD-hard.
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10.1 Why are non-monotone markets hard?
Before delving into the details of the construction, we attempt to reach some
intuition: why should we expect equilibrium computation to be hard in non-
monotone markets? Probably the most intuitive algorithm for finding market
equilibrium is via tatonnement: raise the prices of over-demanded goods, and de-
crease the prices of under-demanded goods. For many markets, the tatonnement
process is also computationally efficient [CMV05]. One obvious problem is that
when the market is non-monotone, the tatonnement step actually takes us fur-
ther away from equilibrium. However, the non-monotonicity is only local: if we
set the (relative) price of the non-monotone good high enough, even the most
enthusiastic traders can only afford a small amount.
The “real” reason that tatonnement fails to converge efficiently for non-
monotone markets is a little more subtle. What happens when the demand
for the non-monotone good g increases by a factor of (1 + δ) for some small δ?
The tatonnement increases the price of g, which further increases the demand.
Eventually, the price is high enough, and the demand is reduced; but due to the
non-monotonicity we may have to increase the price by larger factor, i.e. (1 + δ′)
for δ′ > δ. Now, another trader with a positive endowment of g has increased
her spending budget by (1 + δ′), further increasing the demand for yet another
good (by a larger factor). Thus a small change in the demand for one good may
cause a much larger change in the demand for another good. Exploiting this
“butterfly effect” lies at the heart of Chen et al’s construction.
10.2 High-level structure of the proof
Our reduction from polymatrix games to non-monotone markets closely follows
the footsteps of [CPY13]. To gain some intuition, consider two goods g2i−1
and g2i for each player i, corresponding to her two available strategies (soon
each of those goods will become a subset of goods). Let pi (g2i−1) and pi (g2i)
denote their corresponding prices; those prices correspond to the probabilities
that player i assigns to her respective strategies. For every i, j ∈ [n], we add
a trader who is interested in selling g2i−1 and buying g2j−1 (and similarly for
(2i, 2j − 1), (2i− 1, 2j), and (2i, 2j)). This trader has an endowment of g2i−1
that is proportional to P2i−1,2j−1, the utility of player j in the bimatrix game
with player i, when they both play the first strategy. Qualitatively, if the price
pi (g2i−1) is high (player i assigns a high probability to her first strategy), and
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P2i−1,2j−1 is high (player j receives a high utility from playing her first strategy
to i’s first strategy), then the demand for good g2j−1 is high - implying a high
price in every approximate market equilibrium (i.e. player j indeed assigns a
high probability to her first strategy).
In order to turn this qualitative intuition into a proof we use a more complex
construction. The main difficulty comes from the need to amplify the effect of a
higher income for one trader on the incomes of other traders. To this end we con-
sider, for each i ∈ [n], two sequences of goods: g2i−1 = g2i−1,0, g2i−1,1, . . . , g2i−1,4t =
h2i−1 and g2i = g2i,0, g2i,1, . . . , g2i,4t = h2i. The trader mentioned in the previous
paragraph actually owns P2i−1,2j−1 units of good h2i−1; she is still interested in
good g2j−1. Now we construct (Lemma 14) a chain of gadgets that use copies of
the non-monotone markets in U to amplify the small gap guaranteed between
pi (g2j−1) and pi (g2j) to a larger gap between pi (h2j−1) and pi (h2j).
Additionally, we want to bound the range that these prices may take. In
Lemma 11 we use a price regulating gadget [CDDT09, VY11] to control the
relative prices of pi (g2i−1,j) and pi (g2i,j). In Lemma 13 we show that the sums
pii,j = pi (g2i−1,j) + pi (g2i,j) are approximately equal. Finally, in Section A.5 we
combine these lemmata to formalize a quantitative version of the qualitative
intuition described above.
10.3 Adaptations for constant factor inapproximability
As mentioned in the introduction, Corollary 3 has a weakness in comparison to
the results of Chen et al [CPY13]: it only applies to tight approximate market
equilibrium.
Maintaining the constant hardness of approximation through most of [CPY13]’s
proof is rather straightforward, but there are a few hurdles along the way. To
understand the first obstacle, we must consider a subtle issue of normalization.
Chen et al normalize the bimatrix game between every pair of players to have
an average value of 1/2. While this does not change the absolute utility gained
from any deviation, the relative utility from deviation is now divided by a factor
of Θ (n). In contrast, in Theorem 1 we prove hardness for a constant  when
normalizing with respect to a constant degree (3), i.e. each player participates
in only a constant number of bimatrix games. We overcome this difficulty by
using a different normalization: only edges (i.e. bimatrix games) that belong to
the game graph will have an average utility of 1/2, while the utilities on other
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edges remains 0. Since we proved hardness for a degree 3 graphical game, the
normalization only costs us a constant factor.
More serious complications arise when trying to prove [CPY13]’s Lemma 36
for a constant . This lemma says that certain prices (in fact, these are sums
of prices), denoted pii,0 for i ∈ [n], are approximately equal. A key step in the
proof of [CPY13] is to show, roughly, that in every  (n)-approximate market
equilibrium,
pii,0 ≥ 1
n
∑
j∈[n]
pij,0 −O ( (n))
When  (n) is polynomially small, this immediately implies that mini∈[n] pii,0 is
within O ( (n)) of the average, and therefore it must also be that maxi∈[n] pii,0
is within O (n ·  (n)) of the average. When taking a larger  (n), this reasoning
breaks. The first modification we make to overcome this obstacle, is to require
 (n)-tight approximate market equilibrium. This gives a two-sided bound:∣∣∣∣∣∣pii,0 − 1n
∑
j∈[n]
pij,0
∣∣∣∣∣∣ = O ( (n)) (6)
A second issue that arises in the same inequality, is that with our new nor-
malization, which depends on the game graph G, we can only prove that pii,0
approximates the values of its neighbors, denoted NG (i). In other words, (6)
becomes ∣∣∣∣∣∣pii,0 − 1|NG (i)|
∑
j∈NG(i)
pij,0
∣∣∣∣∣∣ = O ( (n)) (7)
In order to relate the value of pii,0 to the corresponding values of the neighboring
vertices, pij,0’s, we consider T consecutive applications of (7): pii,0 is O (T · )-
close to the expectation over pij,0 where j is taken from the distribution of a T -
steps random walk on G starting from i. For example, if G is a constant degree
expander, the random walk converges in O (log n) steps, yielding a (1/ log n)-
inapproximability result.
6Compare with our Lemma 13. The reader may also want to refer to Lemma 6 in the full
version of [CPY13].
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Achieving constant hardness
Finally, in order to achieve hardness for a constant , we want a graph with
constant mixing time - and this clearly cannot be done with a constant degree7.
Instead, in Section A.2 we construct a normalized game whose graph has a
constant mixing time, each vertex has degree O (
√
n), and yet approximating
Nash equilibrium is hard for a constant . In short, we take n copies of the
original n-player game (our new game has n2 players). For any pair of players
that play a (non-trivial) bimatrix game in the original game, we have a copy
of the same bimatrix game between all
(
n
2
)
pairs of their respective copies. We
also add a trivial bimatrix game between every pair of players that belong to
the same copy of the original game. In Section A.2 we argue that these newly
added trivial edges are only a constant fraction of all edges in the new game
graph, yet this graph has a constant mixing time.
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A Non-monotone markets: proof of inapproxima-
bility
In this section we prove our main inapproximability result for non-monotone
markets:
Corollary 3 (Non-monotone markets). Let U be any non-monotone family of
utility functions. There exists a constant U > 0 such that given a market M
where the utility of each trader is either linear or taken from U , finding an
U -tight approximate market equilibrium is PPAD-hard.
A.1 Normalized polymatrix games
We identify n-player, 2-strategy polymatrix graphical games with 2n×2n matri-
ces by letting the (i, j)-th 2× 2 block correspond to the payoff matrix of player
j in the bimatrix game with player i.
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Given a game G, let P′ be the 2n× 2n induced payoff matrix. We normalize
P′ as follows:
P2i,2j−1 =
1/ (2∆) +
(
P
′
2i,2j−1 − P ′2i,2j
)
/ (2∆) (i, j) ∈ E
0 otherwise
(8)
where E is the edge set for the graphical game8 and ∆ is the maximum degree.
We define P2i,2j, P2i−1,2j−1, P2i−1,2j analogously. Notice that P and P
′ have the
same -WSNE, up to the normalization by the degree ∆. In particular finding
an (/∆)-WSNE in P continues to be PPAD-complete.
Observe that in this formulation, finding an -WSNE is equivalent to finding
a vector x ∈ [0, 1]2n s.t. x2i−1 + x2i = 1 and
x> ·P2i−1 > x> ·P2i +  =⇒ x2i = 0
x> ·P2i−1 < x> ·P2i −  =⇒ x2i−1 = 0
A.2 Games on graphs with a constant mixing time
Given the correspondence defined above between n-player games and 2n × 2n
matrices, we see that the structure of the game graph plays a non-trivial role
in the construction. In particular, adding trivial edges between vertices, i.e.
adding zero-utility bimatrix games between players, has no affect on the utility
of the players, but changes the corresponding normalized matrix. For reasons
that will become clear much later in the proof, we would like our game graph
to have a constant mixing time.
Indeed, a trivial candidate with very fast mixing is the complete graph.
However, such a blowup in the degree would dilute our inapproximability factor
in the normalized game. Instead, we consider n copies (v1, . . . , vn) of each player
v ∈ V in the original game. If players u and v play a bimatrix game Gu,v in
the original game G, then for every i, j ∈ [n], we construct the same bimatrix
game Gu,v between ui and vj. Our game graph now consists of n2 vertices, each
with degree9 3n. Finally, within each copy V i, we add trivial edges between all
the vertices not otherwise connected (including self-loops). Normalize this game
using (8). We use G to denote the new game and G for the new game graph; we
8Notice that this definition allows self-loops in the game graph.
9Theorem 1 promises a graphical game of degree at most 3. It is not hard to extend to a
3-regular graph game with only a constant loss in the approximation factor.
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henceforth let ∆ = 4n− 3 denote the degree. In the next two lemmata we show
that this game satisfies the two properties we need: finding an -WSNE of G is
PPAD-complete, and the mixing time of G is constant.
Lemma 8. Given an -WSNE in G, we can (efficiently) construct a (4/3)-
WSNE for G.
Proof. For each player v, we take the average of the mixed strategies of v1, . . . , vn.
The utility of v is the same as the average of utilities of v1, . . . , vn, and if v has a
(4/3)-improving deviation, then at least one of the copies vi has an -improving
deviation. (The (4/3) factor comes from the change in the degree.)
Lemma 9. Let pivi,T be the distribution of a random walk on G after T steps,
starting from vi, and let pi∗ be the uniform distribution on the vertices of G.
Then ∥∥pivi,T − pi∗∥∥1 ≤ (14
)T/2
+
(
3
4
)T/2
= 2−O(T )
Proof. At each step of the random walk, there is a constant probability (greater
than 3/4) of walking on a non-trivial edge, which takes us to another (uniformly
random) copy of the original game; thereafter the copy of the game remains
uniformly random. Similarly, at each step there is a constant probability (greater
than 1/4) of moving to a vertex within the same copy (again, uniformly random).
Thus conditioned on having walked on a non-trivial edge, and then on an edge
within the same copy, the distribution is uniform. Since all vertices have the
same degree, this is also the stationary distribution, and we never leave it.
For simplicity, in the following we redefine n to be the size of G (and hence
∆ ≈ 4√n).
A.3 Construction
Let N be a sufficiently large constant, and let t = logN . Note that N depends
on the parameters of the non-monotone market in U , but not on the size n of
our construction. We use the notation ON (·) to denote the asymptotic behavior
when N goes to infinity (but arbitrarily slower than n). We prove that it is
PPAD-hard to find an η-tight approximate market clearing equilibrium for η =
N−8, where  is the inapproximability factor from Lemma 8.
For each vertex i ∈ [n] we construct a series of 4t + 1 gadgets Ri,j, for
j ∈ [0 : 4t]. Each gadget is composed of:
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Main goods g2i−1,j and g2i,j are the main goods in the reduction. They are
used to encode the weights assigned to strategies x2i−1 and x2i, respectively.
Non-monotone gadget For each j ∈ [4t], we include additional goods si,j,3, . . . , si,j,k
and a non-monotone gadget
nm (µ, γ, g2i−1,j, g2i,j, si,j,3, . . . , si,j,k)
This means that we scale the non-monotone market guaranteed to exist
in U according to parameters γ and µ such that when all the prices are
approximately the same, the excess demand of g2i−1,j increases linearly
with its price. Formally, we have the following lemma by Chen et al.
Lemma 10. (Lemma 3.1 of [CPY13]) There exist two (not necessarily
rational) positive constants c and d with the following property. Given
any γ > 0, one can build a market Mγ with utilities from U and goods
g2i−1,j, g2i,j, si,j,3, . . . , si,j,k in polynomial time in 1/γ such that:
Let fγ,µ (x) denote the excess demand function of g2i−1,j when the price of
g2i−1 is 1 + x, and the prices of all other k− 1 goods are 1− x. Then fγ,µ
is well defined over [−c, c] with |fγ,µ (0)| ≤ µγ and its derivative f ′γ,µ (0) =
d > 0. For any x ∈ [−c, c] , fγ,µ (x) also satisfies
|fγ,µ (x)− fγ,µ (0)− µdx| ≤ |µx/D| , where D = max {20, 20/d}.
Finally, we would like to set µ = ∆/d; in particular, this would imply
that fγ,µ (x) ≈ ∆x. However, as mentioned above, d may be irrational.
Instead, let d∗ be a positive rational constant that satisfies
1− 1/D ≤ d∗ · d ≤ 1
We set the parameters µ = d∗∆ and γ = 1/N6.
Price regulating gadget For j ∈ [4t], we include a price regulating gadget
pr (τ, αj, g2i−1,j, g2i,j, si,j,3, . . . si,j,k) ,
whereas for j = 0, we don’t have goods si,0,3, . . . si,0,k, and simply include
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the gadget
pr (τ, α0, g2i−1,0, g2i,0) .
The parameters are set to τ = N∆ and αi = 2i/N5. Notice that α0 = N−5
and α4t = N−1 = β.
This gadget ensures that in any approximate equilibrium, the price ra-
tio pi (g2i−1,j) /pi (g2i,j) is always in the range
[
1−αj
1+αj
,
1+αj
1−αj
]
. Furthermore,
within each gadget Ri,j, the prices of all the goods besides g2i−1,j are ex-
actly equal:
pi (g2i, j) = pi (si,j,3) = · · · = pi (si,j,k) .
More specifically, we have two traders T1 and T2 with endowments (k − 1) τ
of g2i−1,j, for T1 and τ of each of the other goods for T2. The utilities are
defined as
u1 = (1 + αj)x (g2i−1,j) + (1− αj)
(
x (g2i,j) +
k∑
l=3
x (si,j,l)
)
u2 = (1− αj)x (g2i−1,j) + (1 + αj)
(
x (g2i,j) +
k∑
l=3
x (si,j,l)
)
.
In particular, T1 and T2 do not trade whenever pi (g2i−1,j) /pi (g2i,j) ∈(
1−αj
1+αj
,
1+αj
1−αj
)
.
Auxiliary goods For j = 0, we also include an auxiliary good auxi. Its even-
tual purpose is to disentangle the price of g2i−1,0 and g2i,0 from the utility
that the actions of player i causes to other players.
Single-minded traders graph
We connect the groups of goods (Ri,j’s) using the following single-minded traders.
We use (w, g1 : g2) to denote a trader with endowment w of good g1 who only
wants good g2. Similarly, we use (w, g1, g2 : g3) to denote a trader who has an
endowment w of each of g1 and g2, and only wants g3.
1. For each i ∈ [n] and j ∈ [0 : 4t− 1], we add two traders fromRi,j toRi,j+1:
(∆, g2i−1,j : g2i−1,j+1) and (∆, g2i,j : g2i,j+1). These traders help propagate
price discrepancies from gi,0 to gi,4t.
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2. Recall that we use gi as short for gi,0 and hi for gi,4t. For each pair
(i, j) ∈ E we add the following four traders: (∆P2i−1,2j−1, h2i−1 : g2j−1),
(∆P2i,2j−1, h2i : g2j−1), (∆P2i−1,2j, h2i−1 : g2j), (∆P2i,2j, h2i : g2j). Since P
is normalized, we have
∆P2i−1,2j−1 + ∆P2i−1,2j = ∆P2i,2j−1 + ∆P2i,2j = 1
These traders will enforce the approximate Nash equilibrium.
3. Connect the auxiliary goods: We let
r2j−1 = 2∆−∆
∑
i∈N (j)
(P2i−1,2j−1 + P2i,2j−1) > 0
r2j = 2∆−∆
∑
i∈N (j)
(P2i−1,2j + P2i,2j) > 0
note that r2j−1 + r2j = 2∆.
We add the following traders: ((1− β) r2j−1,auxj : g2j−1), ((1− β) r2j,auxj : g2j),
and ((1− β) ∆, g2j−1, g2j : auxj).
Notice that the economy graph is strongly connected (because G is strongly
connected); therefore an equilibrium always exists [Max97]. The supplies and
demands for each good are summarized in Table 1.
A.4 Structure of a market equilibrium
We now prove some properties that every η-tight approximate equilibrium pi
must satisfy. Recall that η = N−8, where  is the inapproximability factor for
the polymatrix game.
We begin with the application of the price regulating markets:
Lemma 11. For every i ∈ [n] and j ∈ [0 : 4t],
1− αj
1 + αj
≤ pi (g2i−1, j)
pi (g2i, j)
≤ 1 + αj
1− αj
and
pi (g2i, j) = pi (si,j,3) = · · · = pi (si,j,k)
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Table 1: Goods and traders
good
[total supply]
supplied by demanded by
g2i−1, g2i[
N∆ (1 + oN (1))
] pr trader;(∆, g2i−1 : g2i−1,1),
(∆, g2i : g2i,1);
((1− β) ∆, g2i−1, g2i : auxi)
pr traders;
(∆P2j−1,2i−1, h2j−1 : g2i−1),
...
(∆P2j,2i, h2j : g2i);
((1− β) r2i−1,auxi : g2i−1),
((1− β) r2i,auxi : g2i)
h2i−1[
(k − 1)N∆ (1 + oN (1))
] pr trader;nm traders;
(∆P2i−1,2j−1, h2i−1 : g2j−1),
(∆P2i−1,2j , h2i−1 : g2j)
pr traders;
nm traders;
(∆, g2i−1,4t−1 : h2i−1)
h2i[
N∆ (1 + oN (1))
] pr trader;nm traders;
(∆P2i,2j−1, h2i : g2j−1),
(∆P2i,2j , h2i : g2j)
pr traders;
nm traders;
(∆, g2i,4t−1 : h2i)
g2i−1,j[
(k − 1)N∆ (1 + oN (1))
] pr trader;nm traders;
(∆, g2i−1,j : g2i−1,j+1)
pr traders;
nm traders;
(∆, g2i−1,j−1 : g2i−1,j)
g2i,j[
N∆ (1 + oN (1))
] pr trader;nm traders;
(∆, g2i,j : g2i,j+1)
pr traders;
nm traders;
(∆, g2i,j−1 : g2i,j)
si,j,l[
N∆ (1 + oN (1))
] pr trader;
nm traders;
pr traders;
nm traders;
auxi[
N∆ (1 + oN (1))
] ((1− β) r2i−1,auxi : g2i−1),
((1− β) r2i,auxi : g2i) ((1− β) ∆, g2i−1, g2i : auxi)
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Proof. Follows from the construction of the price regulating markets. For more
details see the proof10 of Lemma 6 in the full version of [CPY13], or previous
works that use similar gadgets [CDDT09, VY11].
We henceforth use pii,j to denote the sum of the (i, j)-th main goods: pii,j =
pi (g2i−1,j) + pi (g2i,j).
Lemma 12.
(1−ON (η)) pii,0/2 ≤ pi (auxi) ≤ (1 +ON (η))pii,0/2
Proof. The total supply of auxi is 2 (1− β) ∆, yet the demand from the single-
minded trader ((1− β) ∆, g2i−1, g2i : auxi) is (1− β) ∆ pii,0pi(auxi) . (For the upper
bound we use the fact that pi is a tight approximate market equilibrium.)
We are now ready to prove that the cost of every pair of main goods is
approximately the same. Let δ = N2η.
Lemma 13. Let pimax = maxi,j pii,j and pimin = mini,j pii,j, then
pimax/pimin ≤ 1 +ON (δ) .
Proof. The proof of this lemma is the main obstacle which requires the tightness
assumption of the market equilibrium, as well as our bound on the mixing time
from Lemma 9.
Recall that by Lemma 11, the prices of all the goods in each gadget Ri,j are
approximately equal. Thus, using our bound on the clearing error, we have that
for each (i, j) ∈ [n]× [0 : 4t],
|total spent on Ri,j − total worth of Ri,j| ≤ ON (η · kN∆) pii,j = ON (η ·N∆)pii,j
(9)
By Walras’ Law, the traders within each Ri,j (i.e. the price regulating and
non-monotone gadgets) contribute the same to both quantities in (9). Similarly,
by Lemma 12, the auxiliary traders contribute ON (η∆pii,0)-approximately the
same (for j = 0). Therefore the money spent on Ri,j by the single minded
traders is approximately the same as the total worth of endowments in Ri,j of
single minded traders:
10In their statement, Chen et al require an -additively approximate equilibrium, and for a
much smaller . However their proof continues to hold with our parameters.
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• For each (i, j) ∈ [n]×[4t], the restriction of (9) to the single-minded traders
gives
|∆pii,j−1 −∆pii,j| = ON (η ·N∆) pii,j (10)
• Similarly, for each group Ri,0, we have∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
l∈N (i)
pil,4t −∆pii,0
∣∣∣∣∣∣ = ON (η ·N∆) pii,0 (11)
Applying (10) inductively, we have that for any i ∈ [n] and for any j, l ∈ [0 : 4t],
|pii,j − pii,l| = ON (η ·Nt) pii,l
Combining, with (11) we have,∣∣∣∣∣∣pii,0 − 1∆
∑
l∈N
GG (i)
pil,0
∣∣∣∣∣∣ = O (η ·Nt)pii,0
Thus for each i, pii,0 is O (η ·Nt)-approximately equal to the average of its neigh-
bors in G. Repeating this argument T times, we have that pii,0 is ON (Tη ·Nt)-
approximately equal to the expectation over a T -step random walk in G starting
from i. By Lemma 9, after T = O (log δ) steps the random walk δ-approximately
converges to the uniform distribution, and we have∣∣∣∣∣∣pii,0 − 1n
∑
l∈[n]
pil,0
∣∣∣∣∣∣ = ON (Tη ·Nt) 1n
∑
l∈[n]
pil,0 + δmax
l∈[n]
pil,0
= ON (δ) max
l∈[n]
pil,0
Finally, we have the following lemma which describes the action of the non-
monotone gadgets.
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Lemma 14. (Lemma 6 of [CPY13])
1 + αj−1
pi (g2i−1,j−1)
=
1− αj−1
pi (g2i,j−1)
=⇒ 1 + αj
pi (g2i−1,j)
=
1− αj
pi (g2i,j)
and
1− αj−1
pi (g2i−1,j−1)
=
1 + αj−1
pi (g2i,j−1)
=⇒ 1− αj
pi (g2i−1,j)
=
1 + αj
pi (g2i,j)
Proof. The demand for g2i−1,j and g2i,j comes from three sources: the single-
minded traders, (∆, g2i−1,j−1 : g2i−1,j) and (∆, g2i,j−1 : g2i,j); the non-monotone
gadget; and the price regulating gadget. Assume without loss of generality that
the first premise holds, i.e. 1+αj−1
pi(g2i−1,j−1)
=
1−αj−1
pi(g2i,j−1)
. When the prices of g2i−1,j
and g2i,j are equal, the demand from (∆, g2i−1,j−1 : g2i−1,j) is larger since she has
more income from g2i−1,j−1. In order to account for this difference, pi (g2i−1,j)
must be higher - but then the demand from the traders in the non-monotone
market increases. Thus we further have to increase pi (g2i−1,j), until we reach
the threshold of the price regulating traders: (1 + αj) / (1− αj).
Formally, normalize pi such that pii,j = pi (g2i−1,j) + pi (g2i,j) = 2. Thus by
Lemma 13, pii,j−1 is also ON (δ)-close to 2. Let f (x) denote the excess demand
from the traders in the non-monotone gadget when pi (g2i−1,j) = 1 + x and
pi (g2i−1,j) = pi (si,j,3) = · · · = pi (si,j,k) = 1 − x (recall from Lemma 11 that
the latter prices are always equal to each other). By Lemma 10, we have that
|f (0)| ≤ µγ, and for all x ∈ [−c, c]:
|f (x)− f (0)− µdx| ≤ |µx/D| .
Now, let pi (g2i−1,j−1) = 1 + y; notice that by Lemma 13, y = αj−1 ±ON (δ).
Let h (x, y) excess demand from all traders besides the two that belong to the
price regulating gadget. Then,
h (x, y) = f (x) +
∆ (1 + y)
1 + x
−∆ = f (x)− ∆x
1 + x
+
∆y
1 + x
For small x, we show that f (x) ≈ ∆x/ (1 + x). More precisely,
|f (x)−∆x/ (1 + x)| ≤ |f (x)− µdx|+ |µdx−∆x|+ ∆ |x− x/ (1 + x)|
≤ |f (0)|+ 2 |µx/D|+ 2∆x2
≤ ∆ · (d∗ · γ + 2x/20 + 2x2)
≤ ∆y
3
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where the first inequality follows from the triangle inequality; the second follows
by application of Lemma 10 for the first difference and the definitions of µ and
d∗ for the second; the third inequality applies the Lemma 10 again; finally the
last inequality holds because for sufficiently large constant N , the parameters γ
and x are sufficiently small.
Therefore, the excess demand must be balanced by the demand from the
price regulating traders, implying that indeed 1+αj
pi(g2i−1,j)
=
1−αj
pi(g2i,j)
.
A.5 From market equilibrium to Nash equilibrium
To complete the proof of Corollary 3, we must construct an -WSNE from any
η-tight approximate market equilibrium.
For each i ∈ [n], let θi = (pi (h2i−1) + pi (h2i)) /2. We define
x2i−1 =
pi (h2i−1) /θi − (1− β)
2β
and x2i =
pi (h2i) /θi − (1− β)
2β
(12)
Observe that x2i−1 + x2i = 1.
Suppose that
x> ·P1 ≥ x> ·P2 + 
We show that this forces x1 = 1 and x2 = 0; by the discussion in Section A.1
this implies that x is indeed an -WSNE.
The following traders spend money on g1:
1. For each i ∈ NG (1), there is a (∆Pi,1, hi; g1) trader. The total money these
traders spend on g1 is∑
∆Pi,1 · pi (h1) =
∑
∆Pi,1 (1− β + 2β · xi) θdi/2e
2. For each i ∈ NG (2), there is a (∆Pi,2, hi; g2) trader. The total money these
traders spend on g2 is∑
∆Pi,2 · pi (h2) =
∑
∆Pi,2 (1− β + 2β · xi) θdi/2e
3. ((1− β) r1,aux1 : g1) and ((1− β) r2,aux1 : g2) traders
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Let M1 be the total amount that these traders spend on g1. Then
M1 =
∑
i∈NG(1)
∆Pi,1 (1− β + 2β · xi) θdi/2e + (1− β) r1pi (aux1)
Normalizing the prices such that 1
n
∑n
i=1 θi = 1/∆, this means that
M1 ≥ 2 (1− β) + 2βx> ·P1 −ON (δ)
Similarly,
M2 ≤ 2 (1− β) + 2βx> ·P2 +ON (δ)
Therefore,
M1 ≥M2 + 2β−ON (δ) = M2 + ΘN (β)
so the difference between the demands for g1 and g2 from these traders is
M1
pi (g1)
− M2
pi (g2)
≥ M2 + ΘN (β)
pi (g1)
− M2 (1 + α0)
pi (g1) (1− α0) = ΘN (β)
Thus the price regulating traders T1 and T2 must have different demands for g1
and g2 - but this can only happen when
1 + α0
pi (g1)
=
1− α0
pi (g2)
Therefore, by consecutive applications of Lemma 14,
1 + β
pi (h1)
=
1− β
pi (h2)
Finally, by (12) this implies that x1 = 1 and x2 = 0.
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